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#### Interp---the Aff must defend a topical plan---the resolution should define the division of ground---it was negotiated and announced in advance, providing both teams a reasonable opportunity to prepare---only a textual reading of the resolution provides a predictable basis for research.

#### The ‘USFG’ means the three branches.

OECD 87. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. 179. Google Book.

1. Political and organizational structure of government The United States America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

#### ‘Resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64. Permanent Edition.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### ‘Antitrust laws’ are statutes.

Grimes ’20 [Charles W; 2020; editor of this Licensing Update and Law Professor at Ava Maria Law School; Wolters Kluwer, “Licensing Update,” https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf]

§13.02 ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Their ‘scope’ is defined by government.

Sagers ’15 [Christopher L; 2015; the James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Cleveland-Marshall Solo Practice Incubator; Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust, “Introduction,” Ch. 1, p. 9]

B. Sources of the Scope of Antitrust Law

The scope of federal antitrust law is governed by three separate authorities: (1) the U.S. Constitution, (2) the language of the antitrust statutes themselves, and (3) the language of other federal statutes and regulations.

#### Vote Neg:

#### 1. Clash---debate requires a predictable topic to motivate in-depth research that yields the values of negation and argument refinement---their interp explodes limits, allows Aff condo, and makes debate a one-sided monologue devoid of argumentation, which turns the case.

#### 2. Fairness---the Neg should win on average 50% of the time---entering a competitive activity proves their arguments are shaped by a drive to win---the insurmountable advantage of being Aff under their unfair model is a reason they should lose.

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#### The 1AC’s critical affirmation of that which is outside civil society has offered moralism when what is needed is organization for Climate Maoism – refusal to seize the state from the capitalist class forecloses a dictatorship of the proletariat

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

Let’s look at this third option more closely. To build towards an eco-communist revolution, we need to avoid both a politics of pure negation and a politics of “critical affirmation.” As Marx argued, revolutions need dialectics. They need us to find what Fredric Jameson calls the “dialectical ambivalence” in capitalism. This means training ourselves to locate aspects of the present that point beyond themselves and towards the communist horizon. Lenin did precisely this after the outbreak of the First World War. Rather than joining with the majority of the socialist parties of the Second International in capitulating to imperialist war, and rather than wallowing in melancholia following the betrayal of so many of his German comrades as they voted for war credits, Lenin saw in the war an opportunity for revolutionary advance. Those interested in the emancipation of the working class needed to fight not for peace but for the dialectical conversion of nationalist war to civil war. The war, and the collapse of the Second International, was the opportunity for something new.

What would it mean to think dialectically about the GND? We think it would mean stripping the policy’s reformist content away from its revolutionary form. For decades environmental movements in the capitalist core have busied themselves fighting for local solutions to global problems: cooperatives, local currencies, urban agriculture, and ethical consumerism. As these experiments blossomed, the climate crisis continued unabated. More pipelines were built, more indigenous land was stolen, more fires raged, and more species flickered out of existence.

In their form the GND and GIR put localism aside. Both recognize that the climate crisis demands a state-led, centrally planned, and global response. They take for granted that we need a state to intervene on behalf of nature and workers against capital. The fact that the GND and GIR promise to do this is what makes capitalists fear them. Those who are excited about the promise of the GND—such as Riofrancos—have similarly turned towards the state as a terrain of struggle and a locus of power. Consciously or not, these movements have learned from the failures of Climate Camp, Occupy, and the Movement of Squares. It is not enough to suspend the normal running of things. Taking responsibility means taking power and organizing society in what Marx called the interests of “freely associated workers,” or more controversially, the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” The struggles to implement the GND and GIR tell us that environmentalists are increasingly aware of the need to seize the state—and the need to develop a fighting organization with the capacity to do so.

Against State Denialism

Ironically, at almost the precise moment that progressive movements have become conscious of the necessity of a climate response operating at the necessary scale, the Marxist left has taken a state-phobic turn. Consider “disaster communism.” Confronted with the choice between ruin or revolution, disaster communism opts for ruin as the path to revolution—without considering the form of association necessary to ensure that the revolution ushers in a more equal, just, and sustainable world rather than insulated groups struggling with each other over resources. In lieu of the revolutionary subject emphasized in the Marxist tradition, disaster communism turns to climate breakdown as the agent of history.

Drawing on Rebecca Solnit’s book A Paradise Built in Hell, a study of how practices of mutual aid and collectivity arise in the aftermath of crises, disaster communists argue that we do not need to seize the state because the state will be washed away, along with the capitalist system itself, as the full force of the climate crisis crashes down around us. While Solnit emphasizes the ephemerality of “disaster communities,” disaster communists ask how these communities might be sustained and even flourish well beyond the punctual point of a climatic disaster wrought by capitalism. Theirs is a vision of communism arising, triumphantly, from capital’s ashes. Vision may be too strong a term here: for the most part, disaster communism is a hope, a screen covering over the need for organization and planning at a scale that can produce a form of life suitable for billions of people and nonhuman species.

Responses to the Covid-19 pandemic illustrate the point. Even as mobilized volunteers and mutual aid can meet real needs by distributing meals, assisting neighbors, and coordinating webinars, they are inadequate to the most demanding tasks of developing and administering tests for the virus, securing hospital beds in intensive care units, producing and distributing respirators, and providing adequate protective equipment at the necessary scale. Mutual aid is inspiring, but it’s not enough—it can’t stop the hoarders and profiteers, pay hospital bills and unemployment insurance, release prisoners and detainees. It doesn’t scale, particularly when the prevailing logic comes from the market. That capital accumulation takes place through dispossession as well as exploitation brings home the real limit of mutual aid: poor and working people do not own the means of production and therefore production does not meet social needs.

Furthermore, in extreme capitalist countries like the US and the UK, social and political diversity means that many do not voluntarily comply with public health recommendations. Employers insist that employees come to work. Students spend spring break at the beach. Individuals approach their own situations in terms of exceptions, reasons why they don’t need to comply with directives. Orders from the state don’t eliminate all these exceptions. But they reduce them substantially, most significantly by preventing employers from requiring workers to put themselves at risk. Were the state used as an instrument of working class power, it would, at a minimum, guarantee that workers would continue to be paid, that the health and well-being of people would be the focus of government attention. The pandemic demonstrates a truth that the left’s responses to climate change have been slow to acknowledge: global problems require a centrally planned response with all the tools that are at the disposal of the state. Failing to seize hospitals, industry, banks, and logistical networks from the capitalist class results in needless death—and gives a green light to disaster capitalism.

Geoff Mann and Joel Wainwright’s 2018 book Climate Leviathan provides another state-phobic response to the climate crisis. Mann and Wainwright predict four possible resolutions to the climate crisis. The first is “Climate Leviathan.” This is a global sovereign power that would act in the interests of capitalist states and global capital to limit the effects of climate breakdown. This is effectively the scenario hoped for by Chakrabarty. The second is “Climate Behemoth.” Here, states cannot agree to constitute a global sovereign power and so the crisis is tackled by international capital in the interests of international capital. The third is “Climate Mao.” In this scenario a single authoritarian sovereign power, most likely China, leads global mitigation and adaptation efforts. Finally, their fourth and preferred scenario is “Climate X.” This would be a so-far-nonexistent social movement that struggles to resolve the crisis in a way that is simultaneously anti-capitalist and anti-sovereign.

Alyssa Battistoni and Patrick Bigger have already written compelling Marxist critiques of Climate Leviathan. We don’t need to rehearse them here. We note, however, that responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have resembled Climate Behemoth and Climate Mao. While the US, UK, and EU have been slow to use state power to coordinate either within or among the themselves, instead following the dictates and interests of capital in their structuring of economic responses to the pandemic, China has modeled both rigorous state action with respect to quarantines and international leadership with respect to provision of medical aid. What’s important for our argument here is that Mann and Wainwright’s state denialism prevents them from conceiving the state as a form for the collective power of working people, an instrument through which we remake the economy in the service of human and nonhuman life.

Jasper Bernes offers a third state-phobic Marxist response to the climate crisis. A proponent of communization theory, Bernes argues that communism means “the immediate abolition of money and wages, of state power, and of administrative centralization.” Absent something like a state, how is a just response to the climate crisis even possible? Should we assume that it will spontaneously emerge as a result of disparate local disaster communisms? Should we assume that access to food, water, living space, and capacities for self-defense will be equally distributed, that by some miracle the immediate abolition of money and wages will leave everyone in the same position? The pandemic gives us insight into the inability of the communization approach to respond to catastrophe: when millions who have been dependent on the wage are without it, they require centralized state power to seize the means of production and distribution and administer both on the scale necessary to meet social needs. The issue isn’t the power of the state. It’s the class wielding state power.

#### Pseudopolitics Link – Theorizing social life within the deadening “fact of blackness” is not revolutionary but enables corporate capture that depoliticizes anti-imperial solidarity within the world

Okoth 20 (Kevin Ochieng Okoth, MPhil in Political Theory at University of Oxford. “The Flatness of Blackness: Afro-3Pessimism and the Erasure of Anti-Colonial Thought.” <https://salvage.zone/issue-seven/the-flatness-of-blackness-afro-pessimism-and-the-erasure-of-anti-colonial-thought/?fbclid=IwAR2HUmzVvPWlokXjUhdFYjTDWLX4wTcS1MxbH1pogzBtz6Lu4-iCXA4d1sw> )

Note – Okoth abbreviates afropessimism as “AP” throughout his work

But as Annie Olaloku-Teriba points out in her excellent critique ‘Afro-Pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness’, the AP™ finds a ‘comfortable antagonist’ in Moten, whose Black Ops can be neatly reintegrated into the concept of social death. It is also telling that Sexton, in ‘Ante-Anti-Blackness’, rather successfully merges the AP™ conception of social death with Moten’s Black Ops by arguing that:

“A living death is as much a death as it is living. Nothing in Afro-pessimism suggests that there is no black (social) life, only that black life is not social life in the universe formed by the codes of state and civil society, of citizen and subject, of nation and culture, of people and place, of history and heritage, of all the things that colonial society has in common with the colonised, of all the things that capital has in common with labour – the modern world system.”

Sexton shows that Moten’s Black Ops is nothing other than what he instead calls ‘the social life of social death’. There is no either/or distinction between social life and social death: we can think both together by positing that Black life is lived in the underground. Moten even acknowledges, in ‘Blackness and Nothingness (Mysticism in the Flesh)’, that the AP™ and Black Ops are engaged in the same theoretical project:

“In the end, though life and optimism are the terms under which I speak, I agree with Sexton – by way of the slightest most immeasurable reversal of emphasis – that Afro-pessimism and black optimism are not but nothing other than one another. I will continue to prefer the black optimism of his work just as, I am sure, he will continue to prefer the Afro-pessimism of mine.”

For both Afro-pessimists and Black Optimists, the afterlife of slavery is characterised by the social death of the Black/Slave and a heavily distorted version of Fanon’s concept of the ‘fact of blackness’. This assumption, however, precludes the participation of Black Ops in radical politics and confines resistance to spaces of Black performance art.

By confining Black resistance to spaces outside of the anti-Black structures of civil society, and by undercutting the possibility for anti-imperialist solidarity between racialised people across the world, the AP™ theories have opened up a space for the corporate capture of Blackness. We need only recall last year’s Nike campaign, prominently featuring the face of former NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick, who has been blackballed by the league for kneeling during the national anthem. Since the incident, he has taken on the role of radical Black activist, complete with Panther-esque leather jackets, an afro and Afrocentric jewellery. While Kaepernick’s struggle against the racist and exploitative NFL owners and executives is, of course, legitimate and necessary, the co-optation of his struggle by a large corporation is certainly a cause for concern. Nike is notorious for its use of sweatshop labour (including both forced and child labour), and its history of exploitative labour practices has been well-documented throughout the years. By detaching the struggles of African-Americans from those of racialised workers in the Global South, Nike can present itself as a progressive vehicle for Black emancipatory politics, while completely sidelining the plight of non-white workers outside of the US. Here we might recall a powerful statement by Fred Hampton to illustrate just how far from revolutionary Black politics we find ourselves:

We don’t think you fight fire with fire best; we think you fight fire with water best. We’re going to fight racism not with racism, but we’re going to fight with solidarity. We say we’re not going to fight capitalism with black capitalism, but we’re going to fight it with socialism […] We’re going to fight […] with all of us people getting together and having an international proletarian revolution.

Wilderson and Sexton have been captured by corporate interests in much the same way. In their case, however, it is not a large corporation that co-opts Blackness, but rather the neoliberal university. Is it at all surprising that two professors working within the prestigious University of California system promote a theoretical framework that requires no political action from Black writers and activists other than simply being Black? Not only is AP™ a product of the neoliberal university, it also promotes its authors survival and flourishing within the corporate structures of higher education. When asked about his framework for psychological and physical resistance by the hosts of iMiXWHATiLiKE, Wilderson neatly dodges any commitment to radical politics with the excuse that it could cost him his academic job.

“This is so much a part of what it means to be a professor. I feel like cussing people out all the time. But if I do, I violate University of California’s civility laws, tenure or not I’m out the door, right? And that tempers my speech. So, I think that what I have to offer is not a way out. What I have to offer is an analysis of the problem. And I don’t trust me as much as I trust Black people on the ground.”

Wilderson is aware that the AP™ rely on their activist supporters and social media following to maintain their privileged position within the university – without the activists and organisers on the ground, the AP™ could not prove the market value of its work to the neoliberal institution. By creating a framework for the analysis of race that lends itself to co-optation by corporate interests, the AP™ has certainly demonstrated that it can convert Blackness into profit. All the while, these theorists delude themselves that they are spearheading a truly radical Black movement. In the introduction to a collection of essays on AP™, the editors (who presumably include Sexton and Wilderson) even have the audacity to claim that they are ‘motivated by a desire to contribute to […] bringing these writings out of the ivory towers of the academy’ and that they wish to ‘remove the materials from this sitting place and see them proliferate among those in the streets and prisons’. True, they have succeeded in disseminating a watered-down version of their musings to activists and organisers; but what they have passed on is nothing short of anti-Black, in the sense that it works against the true liberation of Black people of all classes.

Today, such Blackness (and the pseudo-politics that is attached to it) is more useful for academic promotions, Instagram hashtags, and Nike adverts than for any revolutionary or emancipatory politics worthy of the name. The people who truly benefit – or rather profit – from the AP™ brand are the academics and the various university presses and journals who jump at every opportunity to unleash a plethora of AP™ books and articles onto the academic book market. While the AP™ may seem like a niche theoretical discourse, its influence extends far beyond the university: as Olaloku-Teriba argues, the AP™’s theoretical framework provides ‘the structuring logic of various political formations in the era of #BlackLivesMatter’. What is at stake in the debate, therefore, is nothing less than the possibility of a revolutionary Black politics. Maybe African-Americans on the streets or in prison would do well to reach for George Jackson’s Soledad Brother and steer clear of the AP™ and Black Ops.

#### Their use of economic metaphors such as “monopoly” as the “psychic and ontological homogenization of social wealth” trades off with anti-capitalist organizing.

P.W. Zuidhof 12, Associate Professor in European political economy in the European Studies program in the Department of History, European Studies and Religious Studies at the University of Amsterdam, *Imagining Markets: The Discursive Politics of Neoliberalism,* 2012, Pages 4-11.

Neoliberalism as a Discursive Politics of the Market

Many critics of neoliberalism have tried to capture the exuberance of the market imagery in neoliberalism. The cultural critic Thomas Frank for instance, documents in One Market under God (2001) how the market has become an important cultural icon which invaded public discourse and our cultural imaginations. Frank (2001, 29) for instance points out how a variety of cultural techniques, ranging from advertising, business journalism, management books, to cultural studies have created a brand of “market populism” – he cites Newsweek columnist Robert Samuelson’s locution “the Market ‘R’ Us” – in which ‘the market’ is equated with ‘the people’ to the point that the market became to be seen as more democratic than conventional institutions of a democracy. In an attempt to address the excessive market imagery of neoliberalism, critics resort to all sorts of market-based neologisms. Like Thomas Frank, one turns for instance to religious imagery to speak of neoliberalism as a “market theology,” or the gospel of “freemarket religion” (e.g. Cox 1999). In secular terms, one invokes the image of a “free market mythology” (viz. Perelman 2006) or “The Cult of the Market” (Boldeman 2011). The market is especially concatenated with political images, as in Frank’s “market populism,” or when neoliberalism is put down as a form of “market democracy” (Chomsky 1999), “market liberalism,” or instead described as a form of “market dictatorship” (Attali 1997). The specter of terrorism is once more raised to bring out the character of neoliberalism, for instance by Henry Giroux in his book, The Terror of Neoliberalism (2004). It has especially become fashionable to refer to neoliberalism and its policies as a form of “market fundamentalism,” a depiction that has been popularized by the likes of George Soros (e.g. 1998) and notably Joseph Stiglitz (2002) in his critique of the IMF. These examples indicate that with neoliberalism, the market has emerged as a powerful image that spectacularly altered our thought and speech not only in political and policy discourse but public discourse at large. I imagine that major market philosophers from the past such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and even Friedrich Hayek or Milton Friedman would have great difficulties understanding what is meant by some of these terms. The perceived exuberance of neoliberalism can therefore be traced to how the image of the ‘market’ was mobilized and developed into a powerful signifier to re-imagine and rearticulate many important spheres of life.

The New Yorker cartoon pointedly makes clear that neoliberalism relies on the work of metaphor. Rather than straightforwardly instructing the participants in the boardroom that terrorism should be fought at the market, the message is to fight terrorism as if it were a market. Neoliberalism, I would claim, always entails mobilizing the market in a metaphorical sense. The message of neoliberalism is consistently a metaphorical one: think of … as a market, (and govern it accordingly).6 Neoliberalism invites us to imagine virtually everything as a market, ranging from health care, universities to the military, pensions, personal relationships, families, ethics, aesthetics and the state and politics itself. The excessive quality of neoliberalism is therefore found in its use of the market as a metaphor and its ability to displace the state.

The assessment in this thesis of the challenge of neoliberalism and its politics of the market, will therefore begin by distinguishing literal references to the market from metaphorical ones. Others pointed out before that in assessing the politics of markets it is important to recognize that we often speak of markets in metaphorical terms. In Contested Commodities, the legal philosopher Margaret Radin (1996) begins her analysis of what goods can properly be bought and sold, by distinguishing literal from metaphorical markets. As against literal markets where goods are exchanged for money, at metaphorical markets there are no actual exchanges involving money but entails interactions that “are talked about as if they did” (3). Radin employs the term market rhetoric to refer to the vocabulary or discourse in which metaphorical markets emerge. Radin claims that on a theoretical level for instance, Chicago scholars such as Becker and Posner engage in market rhetoric, and “in doing so they extend the market, metaphorically at least, beyond what we are conventionally comfortable with” (4). In her view, by conflating literal and metaphorical markets, market rhetoric may give way to what she calls universal commodification. It means that goods are solely viewed as alienable market goods and only have exchange value. In her book, Radin argues for the importance of incomplete commodification. This is the view that complete commodification is not, and should not be applicable to most cases of goods. Without further engaging with the details of Radin’s account, her conceptual distinction between literal and metaphorical markets raises an important insight. Among other things, her book analyzes some of the normative implications of the metaphorical extension of the market. While she exclusively concentrates on the metaphorical extension of the market in (mostly economic) theory, I would argue that neoliberalism is founded on an analogous use of metaphorical markets, but in political discourse. Neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric to rearticulate our political understandings. Without her calling it as such, Radin’s book could be read as a normative analysis of the metaphorical politics of neoliberalism.

By drawing attention to the fact that neoliberalism relies on metaphorical markets and market rhetoric, the intellectual challenge posed by neoliberalism is to further specify the nature of its political project. Apart from the question which will be addressed in chapter 3, whether neoliberalism should be construed as either ideology, policy agenda or rather something else, it needs to be determined what kind of political project it amounts to. The hypothesis of this thesis is that neoliberalism is best understood as a kind of discursive politics. By discursive politics, I broadly mean a type of politics that achieves its goals discursively, by rearticulating a prior structure of understanding. Every form of politics of course avails itself of discourse, for example when ‘neoliberals’ call for the liberalization of certain markets. The concern here is however not with this more narrowly defined discourse of politics, but rather with the politics of discourse (viz. Connolly 1993, 221).

Put very schematically – although the dividing lines are ultimately hard to draw – my idea of neoliberalism as a discursive politics differs from conventional conceptions of politics in claiming that in important respects neoliberalism depends on language and discursive means to attain political effects. The basic idea is that discursive interventions impact the way we perceive the organization of the social world and how we conceive of the good life. Where traditional, for instance liberal conceptions of politics take the organization of social life largely as given and view politics as a contest of preferences and opinions, discursive politics affects the constitution of our social world and our conceptions of the good life. Rather than asking for the liberalization of markets, the discursive politics of neoliberalism mobilizes the metaphor of the market to rearticulate how we to think of a certain area of life.

The idea of discursive politics as pursued in this thesis, is not unique but inspired by a longer tradition within poststructural political thought and discourse theory as found with Laclau and Mouffe (2001), Butler (1993, 1997), Shapiro (1981, 1984), or Connolly (1993). One of its insights is that discourse is inherently political because discursive constructions inevitably privilege certain aspects over others. The flip-side of this insight is however that any discursive construction is fundamentally unstable and subject to rearticulation. Laclau (e.g. Laclau 1996, 2000, 2008) at times emphasizes that rhetorical displacements or “tropological substitutions” are indispensable in mediating the rearticulation of existing discursive structures. Shifts in discourse are always tropological as they allow for the making and breaking of the discursive field. The political power of metaphor then is its capacity to rearticulate a certain discursive field. Since the market metaphor performs such a function in neoliberalism, it seems particularly relevant to approach neoliberalism as a discursive form of politics. Neoliberalism is then best characterized as the discursive politics of the market metaphor. Not all politics surrounding neoliberalism is always necessarily discursive in this strong sense and no doubt also amounts to conventional contests over preferences and opinions. Our first brush with neoliberalism here however suggests that its most important challenge is its discursive politics.

This thesis studies the discursive politics of neoliberalism, both theoretically and empirically. Since the discursive politics of the market continues to have a tremendous impact on contemporary political discourse, it is relevant to assess its effects. As the discursive market politics of neoliberalism particularly challenges our traditional views of the interrelation between the market and the state, the main question is to determine how the discursive politics of neoliberalism re-imagines the way this relation is perceived. This way, neoliberalism calls for a re-evaluation of the intersections between economics and politics. How do the manifold ways of spreading market metaphors displace and destabilize existing understandings of the relation between markets and states? What is at stake in the invitation of neoliberalism to imagine markets for everything and especially as a substitute for the state? As we will see, the central issue behind neoliberalism’s rewriting of the relation between the market and the state is that the latter challenge our traditional view of how to govern and how to conceive of government. The argument of this thesis is that the discursive market politics of neoliberalism inaugurates new ways of conceiving of government. The main task of this thesis is to assess exactly how neoliberalism is rewriting our view of government, and to determine what its political consequences are.

#### Capitalism ensures climate apartheid and extinction

Heron & Dean 20 (Kai Heron, editor at ROAR Magazine. Jodi Dean, Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. “Revolution or Ruin.” E-Flux. Journal #110 - June 2020. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/110/335242/revolution-or-ruin/> //shree)

We know how the first paragraph begins. We’ve read about the changing climate for over twenty years, infrequently at first and then daily until we couldn’t deny it any longer. The world is burning. The oceans are heating up and acidifying. Species are dying in the Sixth Great Extinction. Koalas have replaced polar bears as the charismatic species whose dwindling numbers bring us to tears. Millions are displaced and on the move, only to be met with fences, borders, and death.

We’ve read the news and it keeps getting worse. As pandemics spread, as the climate crisis continues unabated, the imperatives of capital prevent state action on anything but protecting banks and corporations. Since 1988, when human-induced climate change was officially recognized by the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the oil and gas sector has doubled its contribution to global warming. The industry emitted as much greenhouse gas over the twenty-eight years after 1988 as it had in the 237 years since the beginning of the industrial age. Regular reports announce that the atmospheric impact of these emissions is manifesting faster than scientists previously expected. The IPCC clock tells us that we have eleven years to prevent warming from rising more than 1.5 degrees above preindustrial levels. Some places on earth already hit that mark in the summer of 2019. “Climate change”—that innocuous moniker preferred by Republican political consultant Frank Lutz and adopted by the George W. Bush administration because “global warming” seemed too apocalyptic—has moved from seeming far away and impossible to being here, now, and undeniable. This has not stopped the United States and Canada from providing economic relief funds in the wake of coronavirus to oil and gas companies.

Those least responsible for climate change, those who have suffered the most from capitalism’s colonizing and imperial drive, are on the frontlines of the climate catastrophe. How to find clean water amidst never-ending drought? How to gather needed herbs, food, and firewood amidst rapid deforestation? How to survive the floods and fires? Centuries of colonialism, exploitation, and war undermine people’s capacities to survive and thrive, hitting poor people, women, children, people with disabilities, already disadvantaged racialized and national minorities, and the elderly hardest of all. According to a UN report, “We risk a ‘climate apartheid’ scenario where the wealthy pay to escape overheating, hunger and conflict while the rest of the world is left to suffer.” Capitalism has always permitted some to flourish by forcing others to fight for survival. The climate crisis—and now the coronavirus—intensifies these dynamics into a global class war. In Marx’s words, “ruin or revolution is the watchword” for our times.

#### Vote neg for Maoist ethics against capitalist apartheid – only unifying the colonial underclass through a People’s Liberation Army can destroywhite capitalist civilization and institute a World Black Dictatorship

Kelley and Etsche 99 (Robin D.G. Kelley, Robin Davis Gibran Kelley (born March 14, 1962) is the Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA.[1][2] From 2006 to 2011, he was Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California (USC),[3] and from 2003 to 2006 he was the William B. Ransford Professor of Cultural and Historical Studies at Columbia University. From 1994 to 2003, he was a professor of history and Africana Studies at New York University (NYU) as well the chairman of NYU's history department from 2002 to 2003.; and Betsy Etsche, Assistant Prof of American Studies at University of Kansas. “Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution.” Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society. V1 N4. P18-20 //shree) Note: RAM = Revolutionary Action Movement founded by Freeman, Max Stanford, and Wanda Marshall.

Maoism’s emphasis on revolutionary ethics and moral transformation, in theory at least, resonated with black religious traditions (as wells as American Protestantism more generally), and like the Nation of Islam, black Maoists preached self-restraint, order, and discipline. It is quite possible that in the midst of a counterculture that embodied elements of hedonism and drug use, a new wave of student and working-class radicals found Maoist ethics attractive. On his return from China, Robert Williams – in many respects RAM’s founding father – insisted that all young black activists “undergo personal and moral transformation. There is a need for a stringent revolutionary code of moral ethics. Revolutionaries are instruments of righteousness.” For black revolutionaries, the moral and ethical dimension of Mao’s thought centered on the notion of personal transformation. It was a familiar lesson, embodied in the lives of Malcolm X and (later) George Jackson: the idea that one possesses the revolutionary will to transform himself. (These narratives are almost exclusively male despite the growing number of memoirs by radical black women). Whether or not RAM members lived by the “Code of Cadres,” Maoist ethics ultimately served to reinforce Malcolm’s status as a revolutionary role model.

RAM’s twelve-point program called for the development of freedom schools, national black student organizations, rifle clubs, black farmer cooperatives – not just for economic development but to keep “community and guerilla forces going for a while” – and a liberation guerilla army made up of youth and unemployed. RAM placed special emphasis on internationalism, pledging support for national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as well as the adoption of “Pan-African socialism.” In line with Cruse’s seminal essay, “Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American,” RAM members saw themselves as colonial subjects fighting a “colonial war at home.” As Stanford wrote in an internal document, titled “Projects and Problems of the Revolutionary Movement.” (1964), “RAM’s position is that the Afro-American is not a citizen of the USA, denied his rights, but rather he is a colonial subject enslaved. This position says that the Black people in the USA are a captive nation suppressed and that their fight is not for integration into the white community but one of national liberation.”

As colonial subjects with a right to self-determination, RAM saw Afro-America as a de facto member of the nonaligned nations. RAM members even identified themselves as part of the “Bandung world,” going so far as to hold a conference in November 1964 in Nashville called “The Black Revolution’s Relationship to the Bandung World.” In a 1965 article published in RAM’s journal Black America, members started to develop a theory of “Bandung Humanism” or “Revolutionary Black Internationalism,” which argued that the battle between Western imperialism and the Third World – more than the battle between labor and capital – represented the most fundamental contradiction in our time. They linked the African-American freedom struggle with what was happening in China, Zanzibar, Cuba, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Algeria, and they characterized their work as part of Mao’s international strategy of encircling Western capitalist countries and challenging imperialism. After 1966, the term “Bandung Humanism” was dropped entirely and replaced with “Black Internationalism.”

Precisely what “Black Internationalism” meant was laid out in an incredibly bold thirty-six-page pamphlet published by RAM in 1966, titled The World Black Revolution. Loosely patterned on the Communist Manifesto, the pamphlet identified strongly with China against both the capitalist West and the Soviet empire. The “emergence of Revolutionary China began to polarize caste and class contradictions within the world, in both the bourgeoisie [sic] imperialist camp and also in the European bourgeois communist-socialist camp. In other words, China was the wedge that sharpened contradictions between colonial peoples and the West. Rejecting the idea that socialist revolution will arise in the developed countries of the West, RAM insisted that the only true revolutionary solution is the “dictatorship of the world by the Black Underclass through World Black Revolution.” Of course, the authors were not working from today’s definitions; RAM used “underclass” to encompass all peoples of color in Asia, Latin American, Africa, and elsewhere; the “Black Underclass” was merely a synonym for the colonial world. China was in a bitter fight to defend its own freedom. Now the rest of the “black” world must follow suit: The Black Underclass has only one alternative to free itself of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and neo-colonialism; that is to completely destroy Western (bourgeois) civilization (the cities of the world) through a World Black Revolution and establishing a Revolutionary World Black Dictatorship can bring about the end of exploitation of man by mankind and the new revolutionary world be created. To coordinate this revolution, RAM called for the creation of a Black International and the creation of a “People’s Liberation Army on a world scale.” For all of its strident nationalism, The World Black Revolution concludes that black nationalism “is really internationalism.” Only by demolishing white nationalism/white power can liberation be achieved for everyone. Not only will national boundaries be eliminated with the “dictatorship” of the Black Underclass,” but “the need for nationalism in its aggressive form will be eliminated.” This is a pretty remarkable statement given RAM’s social and ideological roots. But rather than representing a unified position, the statement reflects various tensions that persisted through RAM’s history. On one side were nationalists who felt that revolutionaries should fight for the black nation first and build socialism separate from the rest of the United States. On the other side were socialists like James and Grace Boggs who wanted to know who would rule the “white” nation and what such a presence would mean for black freedom. They also rejected efforts to resurrect the “Black Nation” thesis—the old Communist line that in black-majority countries of the South (the “black belt”) have a right to secede from the union. The Boggses contended that the real source of power lies in the cities, not the rural black belt. In January 1965, James Boggs resigned from his post as Ideological Chairman.

#### Alt alone solves – only a vanguard party, not ontological theorizing, can solve material super exploitation and energize nationalism to fight the Global North’s imperial capital

Okoth 20 (Kevin Ochieng Okoth, MPhil in Political Theory at University of Oxford. “The Flatness of Blackness: Afro-Pessimism and the Erasure of Anti-Colonial Thought.” <https://salvage.zone/issue-seven/the-flatness-of-blackness-afro-pessimism-and-the-erasure-of-anti-colonial-thought/?fbclid=IwAR2HUmzVvPWlokXjUhdFYjTDWLX4wTcS1MxbH1pogzBtz6Lu4-iCXA4d1sw> )

Note – Okoth abbreviates afropessimism as “AP” throughout his work

The second wave of African socialism – or what is frequently called Afro-Marxism – emerged in the mid 1970s, although the period of preparation for the revolutionary struggle began much earlier. This second phase of socialism on the continent was characterised by the adherence to the principles of official Marxist-Leninism with its focus on a vanguard party that leads the way in a socialist revolution, in countries like Burkina-Faso, Somalia, Congo-Brazaville, Madagascar, Libya, Benin and Ethiopia (although the latter was more militaristic in character than revolutionary). The most radical among this wave, however, were the liberation movements in African Portuguese colonies, who were not constitutional nationalist movements – as the previous African socialists had been – but rather revolutionary movements that sought to overthrow the existing social structures and refashion these along socialist lines. Among the most influential proponents of Afro-Marxism are Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Agostinho Neto of Angola, Samora Machel of Mozambique, and Thomas Sankara of Burkina-Faso. Lusophone Afro-Marxists faced much tougher conditions than those of the previous wave of African socialists: one need only consider the decade long civil war fought by the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels in Angola, or the Frelimo’s armed struggle against Renamo in Mozambique, with both rebel groups having received significant funding and support from the US and apartheid South Africa.

Because the second wave of African socialists had studied the mistakes of the first, its leaders were acutely aware of the dangers of internal opposition and the nature of class relations within their respective countries. In Unity and Struggle, Amílcar Cabral sheds some light on the dynamics driving this process of internal opposition. His theory of neocolonialism can help us understand why African socialist experiments, such as that of Nkrumah failed. In the neo-colonial constellation, Cabral argues, imperialist action often takes the form of creating a native bourgeoisie that is loyal to the bourgeoisie of the imperialist nations. This class of native agents emerges from the petty bourgeoisie of bureaucrats and intermediaries in the trading system. Their loyalty to the imperialist bourgeoisie stifles the development of national productive forces, and inevitably leads to underdevelopment. Hence, this class cannot possibly guide the development of productive forces, and cannot be a truly national bourgeoisie. Under neocolonialism, the struggle for the ‘independent’ state (and political power) is thus between the native working class and imperialist capital. As sharp class distinctions emerge, and demobilise nationalist forces, other ties such as tribal solidarity make their way to the forefront of politics; the only escape from this predicament is the destruction of capitalist and imperialist structures ‘implanted in the national soil’.

What Cabral’s analysis can help us understand is why anti-colonial movements were more concerned with the relations of production or the security of territorial boundaries than the eradication of some anti-Black racism. Unlike Mbembe or the AP™, these movements realised that national sovereignty was an indispensible aspect of the struggle against racism (not anti-Blackness) on a global scale. Cabral argued that neocolonialism (as one form of imperialist domination) works on two different levels: both in Europe and in the underdeveloped countries. In Europe, the working class had been pacified through the development of a privileged proletariat that could lower the revolutionary level of the working classes (i.e. labour aristocracy). Similarly, the late Egyptian economist Samir Amin argued that the privileges of those in the Global North, upheld by their control of key monopolies like technology, global finance and media, make it more difficult for an internationalist left to emerge. To be non-Eurocentric, Amin argues, we must address how the ruling classes of the Global North exert control over the South.

Unfortunately, this has failed to happen. The decline of an anti-imperialist left, and the increasing susceptibility of scholars and activists to the pipe dream of a social democracy that doesn’t rely on racism and the super-exploitation of workers in the Global South i.e. what Sandro Mezzadra and Mario Neuman call ‘Wohlfahrsstaat-Populismus’ (welfare state populism) in Jenseits von Interesse und Identität, points towards such failure. In the days of anti-colonial revolutions, class exploitation and racial or national oppression were fused in the imperialist order. Today, the same applies. Racism still plays a significant role in structuring imperialism – we should take seriously those who attempted to analyse this interconnection and put aside ontological and flat theories of Blackness that preclude any struggle against imperialism by severing all ties between those who are racialised as Black and other non-white workers.

In ‘Racial Formation in an Age of Permanent War’, Nikhil Pal Singh argues that racialised groups in the US are incorporated into a system of racialised wage differentials and precarious labour; they represent the relative surplus population in the US. The security state manages ‘civilisational threats to the nation’ (i.e. its surplus population) by deporting immigrant labour, encouraging mass incarceration and militarising the US border, making those who have been racialised more vulnerable to state violence. But in the contemporary imperialist configuration, value created by the super-exploitation of racialised workers still flows from the Global South to the Global North, where this value is appropriated by multinational companies, the nation states they are based in, and the people that reside in these nation states, as Tony Norfield’s The City and John Smith’s Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century show. We must therefore think seriously about how the nation state structures the process of racialisation in the core and in the periphery, and how different national forms of racialisation exist within an imperialist world system.

Given these political-economic realities, the study of race (and consequently also of Blackness) is always enmeshed in a political struggle: this forces us to consider the political implications of our theoretical analysis. True, we can acknowledge that racism has been written into the ‘base’ of capitalism. And, as with the Césaires’ strategic essentialism, there is a space for the affirmation of a positive Blackness directed at challenging colonial prejudices still tied into the national fabric of states in the Global North. Nonetheless, we must also recognise that there is a dire need for anti-imperialist South-South cooperation. It is easy to forget that the global left discourse was once shaped by such debates: the examples of the Panthers in Algeria, Cabral’s visits to Cuba, Cuban support of the MPLA in Angola, and more, illustrate just how many Black people (including African-American organisations like the Panthers and Amiri Baraka’s Congress of Afrikan People) felt the need for a cross-racial push against colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism.

There exists a political and intellectual tradition that has tried to bring the interconnection between race, neocolonialism and imperialism to the forefront of radical politics. The erasure of this tradition – stretching from Sankara and Cabral to Samir Amin – has only served to embolden ontological theories of Blackness and racialisation that take an African-American diasporic and alienated perspective as a priori truth and have no purpose or meaning for those struggling against the realities of imperialist super-exploitation and national oppression on the ground. As Thomas Sankara forcefully put it in his speech before the UN General Assembly: ‘Down with imperialism! Down with neo-colonialism! […] Eternal victory to the peoples of Africa, Latin America and Asia in their struggle! Fatherland or death: we shall triumph.’

## Case

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#### Vote Neg on presumption---their method does nothing to change dominant discourses or structures that perpetuate violence. Their challenge to this has no means of spilling outside of debate, which is necessary for them to solve any of their impacts---their belief that it does is cruel optimism, which turns case---they have only categorized and described violence without an example of how that description ties to what can be done to change it.

#### Their theory is racially paternalistic---the idea that “racial slavery as an originary necropolitical logic […] brought about terror, natal alienation, and social death” zeroes pragmatic harms reduction.

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Nonetheless, the fact that the main current of Afropessimist thinking runs counter to all of Black political history and tradition thus far; the fact that the foundational thinker for this perspective, Frantz Fanon, came to completely opposing conclusions with respect to the nature of politics and solidarity in struggle; the fact that the theory often appears to evade scrutiny or contestation by proclaiming itself “meta-theoretical” and “ontological”; the fact that it asserts a “mandate” for which no empirical evidence is provided and in the face of overwhelming evidence that it constitutes at best a minoritarian and class-specific position — all of this has to be reckoned with by those who want to take Afropessimism to heart.

Perhaps it’s worth reminding ourselves that when he was murdered, Fred Hampton was encouraging poor whites to analogize their position to that of poor Blacks. At the time of his assassination, Malcolm X was embracing and actively seeking to incorporate a cross-racial coalition into his new organization. Ella Baker actively encouraged the deepening of organizational ties and activist links across different communities by emphasizing common struggle and common oppression. What evidence do we have, on the other hand, that the power behind the status quo is quaking at the thought of Black folk gathering in isolation to mourn the end of the world?

If the challenge is more narrowly intellectual and what is needed are correctives to white Marxist hubris, Cedric Robinson’s Black Marxism (1983) already exists. Black feminist thought offers its own counternarratives. Of course, Wilderson doesn’t have to agree with Robinson or the Combahee River Collective. But isn’t it a problem that they aren’t cited even once in his books? Are we to jettison our entire tradition? Were all those who came before us so hopelessly naïve? Are we going to cast aside Vincent Harding’s There Is a River and read nothing but Fanon, Lacan, and Heidegger? Is Bantu philosophy overdetermined by social death even if its worldview was constructed in the absence of the white gaze? Afropessimism has yet to tackle these questions, to take its opponent’s counterarguments and positions seriously.

David Marriott, who is cited by Wilderson as a fellow Afropessimist, asks in his own work: whither Fanon? I wonder this, too. Wilderson says he is the figure he modeled himself on as a young man. Clearly Fanon is central to all of his thinking; indeed, all Afropessimist theorists consider Black Skin, White Masks (1952) a cornerstone text. It is an extraordinary philosophical work, and they are right that it is too often underappreciated. But it is also an extremely complicated intellectual experiment. The third sentence of that book is: “I’m not the bearer of absolute truths.” Fanon proposes to work through the problem of the abjection of Blackness, and that process extends beyond the book into the engaged existentialist revolt and the analysis of colonial relations that he explicitly argues involves the colonized subject, regardless of their race, in The Wretched of the Earth (1961). But even if one were to read only Black Skin, White Masks, it is impossible to miss the humanist assumptions that it opens onto in its conclusion. What else can one make of Fanon stating that “I am not a slave to slavery that dehumanized my ancestors,” and that “the density of History determines none of my acts. I am my own foundation”? How can one miss the assumption of a shareable humanity when he insists that “at the end of this book we would like the reader to feel with us the open dimension of every consciousness.” How can Fanon’s trajectory into the Algerian War of Independence be reconciled with the null trajectories that Afropessimism proposes?

If Afropessimism pushes us to pose harder and sharper questions as Fanon prayed his Black body always would, if it serves to break the shallow cant of the media class and its operatives — then certainly it will have done some good. But on the terms of its own presiding genius it needs to be understood as a waystation and not a terminus on the road to disalienation that Fanon argued is the only path to freedom for Black people in the modern world. That path, which he described in terms of building a “new man,” required him to first understand the depth of abjection that Blackness had been cast into, and then to undo that abjection by mobilizing its ejection from the political order of the West in a grand historical struggle to reconstruct that civilization from the side of the oppressed, an embrace that clearly involves a radical solidarity with non-Black people. This was the mission Fanon was on when he died, and it was a mission he believed Black peoples would have a special, indeed, foundational role in ultimately seeing through.

Realizing these goals does not mean adhering to a formulaic principle or that Black people need to think, act, or speak as a monolith. Fanon and Wilderson are both fond of citing Aimé Césaire’s phrase about “the end of the world” from his poem Notebook of a Return to the Native Land:

One must begin somewhere.

Begin what?

The only thing in the world worth beginning:

The End of the world of course.

These lines do not appear at the end of the poem, however, but roughly halfway through it. The interjection, “of course,” stands in here for the French word “parbleu,” which, even in the late 1930s when Césaire was composing his poem in Paris, carried a folksy and bathetic ring that is only dimly captured in the English but is easier to hear if you imagine these lines as having strayed from a play by Samuel Beckett. Wilderson intones this phrase repeatedly in his book, wielding it like a totemic hammer portending world-destroying events that, in light of the commitments of his own theory, seem to suggest, and possibly wish for, a zero-sum war between the races. But Césaire’s usage is far more ambivalent and ironic, the cry of a man whose revolutionary action must first and foremost be directed inwardly toward a poetic reconstruction of the self, a liberation that requires a self-determined and self-realizing pursuit of truth.

Fanon admired and respected no other intellectual more than Césaire. We know from his letters to his French publisher François Maspero that he imagined his writings as adressed, in no small part, to and for him. The idiosyncratic prose style of Black Skin, White Masks is Fanon’s way of signifying upon a correspondence with Césaire’s poetics. Both writers are acutely aware that the Black thinker is poised precariously between the poles of reflection and action. But both are committed to a humanistic pursuit of truth and both believe in the promise of a radiant Blackness whose time is not yet come. This is why, even as the Algerian War raged around him, Fanon continued his psychiatric research, convinced that understanding the traumas of war and torture would be necessary for healing the postrevolutionary body politic. He wrote for the present and for the future in pursuit of an understanding of himself and of human nature, and for the cause of a political independence and freedom that he hoped would set the entire African continent on a new course. Had he lived, he would have persevered until every colonialist regime from Algiers to Cape Town (the title he had in mind for his last book was Alger-Le Cap) had been driven off the continent. Fanon was no pessimist: true revolutionaries never are.

But must we revolve around Fanon in the first place? Today many activists are more inspired by Fannie Lou Hamer. The US context has its own problems that Fanon only barely understood and addressed. Why not return instead, in this hour of national contestation, to a figure like David Walker and his Appeal to the Coloured Citizens of the World; But in Particular and Very Expressly to those of the United States of America from 1829? We still underappreciate the importance of this text, one of the seminal documents that captures the first great Black intellectual debate in the United States, which was an argument over whether or not we ought to stay in the country at all. Walker believed we should, and he was the first to define and defend the monumental implications of that choice. He attacked the mighty lobby of the American Colonization Society, which included the powerful senator Henry Clay, Abraham Lincoln, and many leading Black intellectuals of the day, who were convinced full equality for Blacks in America was neither possible nor desirable and advocated emigration. Their plans revolved around evacuating the Black population to the Pepper Coast, now the country of Liberia, which emerged from colonial schemes like “Mississippi-in-Africa” that the American Colonization Society founded in the 1830s.

We could have abandoned the country. History could have taken a very different course. American slaves could have returned to Africa and the United States could have become a white ethno-state, a second Europe. The 1820s and ’30s were the last possible moment of undoing or preventing the existence of a Black America. But Black American intellectuals made the choice to stay — to hold this ground and make something new here that the world had never seen. As the political scientist Melvin Rogers points out, Walker’s Appeal not only staked this argument in terms of a principled Black nationalist claim based on the enormous sacrifice of “blood and tears” in slavery; the rhetorical address of the text was also intended to awaken Black Americans to their own potential as a nationally self-consciously political community with a global outlook. “[F]or [Walker],” Rogers writes, “African Americans did not need a prophet to whom they should blindly defer. Rather they needed a community willing to confront practices of domination, capable of responding to their grievances, and susceptible to transcending America’s narrow ethical and political horizon.”

Wilderson’s Afropessimism insists that we are still slaves. Walker insisted in 1829 that the slaves are (and were even then) “colored citizens” of the United States and of the world. That if we are oppressed it is only because we are ignorant of our true strength, because we have been taught to disbelieve and disavow our worth to the world, to the nation, and to each other. Which of these two views is the correct one? I think the historical record and the present state of our politics tells us all we need to know on that score. For it is no coincidence that today it is Black Americans who are once again trying to save the country, to invest in finishing the work of making this place a home that we can live in. In what is a long-standing pattern, the “coloured citizens” of this country are at the forefront of practicing civics. Indeed, what could be more republican than risking one’s health to restore the health of the body politic? To ensure that one of the most basic promises of the state is properly fulfilled: that it apply its law enforcement equally, humanely, and in a manner accountable to the people it serves.

As in past struggles, our principled defense of an ethical civil code has attracted others with its moral force. We have seen a massive response, including from sources traditionally opposed to these concerns, who recognize the profoundly dysfunctional culture of US policing, prisons, and courts. Even many of those who do not agree that these are the result of actively racist policies and attitudes no longer deny that our exceptionally poor record cannot plausibly be unrelated to a long history of antiblack violence and antagonism. For this same reason, likeminded people around the world are hoping for a decisive break with the past‚ taking to the streets across the globe to demand that state actors acknowledge that there really is a history of injury that needs to stop being denied, and that we can and should work together to design a new social contract that will restore the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement and criminal justice in the eyes of all citizens and not just some.

The generation undertaking these endeavors does not seem to require a narrative of optimism in order to take the great risks they have incurred. They have a healthy indifference to both optimism and pessimism alike. Perhaps it results from the demands of carrying out politics in the real world. The incredibly difficult task of organizing and strategizing in order to elevate and amplify the best responses and to rein in and temper the counterproductive ones that delay and diminish a good cause. That’s hard to do in the best of cases: in a turbulent, paranoid, and instantly videotaped public sphere, it’s a Sisyphean task that bad-faith commentators take advantage of.

None of this diminishes the fundamental need for greater self-capacity of the kind Walker called for 200 years ago. Much of the work ahead will necessarily involve a growing capacity for self-reflection, self-criticism, irony, and joy in our politics. It will require acknowledging that struggles against white oppression will never be successful without deepened self-healing in our communities: repairing the relations in families, between men and women; ending the violence directed at trans, queer, and otherwise non-conforming people in our neighborhoods; ending the heinous blood feuds between rival gangs and sets; restoring education and communal trust as our highest priorities and most cherished aspirations. These will always remain preconditional to the realization of freedom and autonomy. It is pursuing these aims as an ongoing collective activity that will make unavoidable the realization as Walker said, that this country is “more ours” than anyone else’s — that we are a historic people with a world-historical destiny that understands our suffering as endowing us with both the right and the responsibility of civilizing the United States in such a way that it reflects the values that our historical experiences bring to it, the freedoms, equalities, and cultural pluralisms that we have made vital and central to its identity.

One doesn’t need to hang on desperately to a mirage of hope. If we look to history, we can see more than enough concrete evidence and example to support the conclusion that a racially defined caste system is unlikely to ever again prevail. Of course, that doesn’t mean history is a smoothly upward-trending curve. We have known terrible setbacks. Yes, the violent defeat of Reconstruction was successful. But the building of Black institutions and the Niagara Movement proceeded anyway. Tulsa was burned to the ground. But its Black citizens turned right around and rebuilt it out of the ashes. The Civil Rights movement was checked by the forces of reaction and the assassin’s bullet; but the world of unquestioned white superiority and authority that George Wallace hoped to preserve is reduced now to a twinkle in David Duke’s blue eye. Yes, creepy white supremacists still crawl out from under mossy stones at opportune moments to wail about their Nordic fantasies in their over-sized khaki pants. Yes, like the militants of the Islamic State, they are capable of carrying out horrific acts of terror and violence. But like that barbaric and fanatical sect, white supremacy is permanently confined to such rear-guard actions because it has already lost — it is trying to reverse a clock going forward — which explains the virulence and incoherence of its outbursts of spastic violence.

We are not at the end, but near the beginning of something new. The pandemic and the multiple underlying crises and fractures it has revealed make vivid that one need not wait so very long for “the end of the world.” The problem, as generations of millenarians have discovered, is that it turns out there’s a morning after the end of the world. And one after that too. The hardest truth is that all the uncertainties that govern the question of what can be done, what will be done, and the difference between the two, remain in our hands. What would Frantz Fanon, or David Walker, or Ella Baker tell us if they saw the streets today? Surely, not that we are at an impasse against an implacable enemy. They would insist that we lift each other and rise together with the spirit of history at our backs. We have done it before. Every time we do it’s a new day.

#### Humanism is key to mobilize movements to stop warming---the thesis of their grammar pathologizes struggles in the Global South.

Karenga 6—Professor and Chair Department of Africa Studies at Cal State University and a major figure in the Black Power movement [Maulana, *Philosophy in the African Tradition of Resistance: Issues or Human Freedom and Human Flourishing in Not Only The Master’s Tools*, 2006, p. 242-5]

Surely, we are at a moment of history fraught with new and old fOnTIS of anxiety, alienation, and antagonism; deepening poverty in the midst of increasing wealth; proposals and practices of ethnic cleansing and genocide; pandemic diseases; increased plunder; pollution and depletion of the environment; constant conflicts, large and small; and world-threatening delusions on the part of a superpower aspiring to a return to empire, with spurious claims of the right to preemptive aggression, to openly attack and overthrow nonfavored and fragile governments openly, and to seize the lands and resources of vulnerable peoples and establish "democracy" through military dictatorship abroad, all the while suppressing political dissent at home (Chang 2002; Cole et at. 2002). These anxieties are undergirded by racist and religious chauvinism, by the self-righteous and veiled references of these rulers to themselves as a kind of terrible and terrorizing hand of God, appointed to rid the world of evil (Ahmad 2002; Arnin 2001; Blum1995). At the same time, in this context of turmoil and terror and the use and threatened use of catastrophic weapons, there is the irrational and arrogant expectation that the oppressed will acquiesce, abandon resistance, and accept the disruptive and devastating consequences of globalization, along with the global hegemony it implies (Martin and Schumann 1997). There is great alarm among the white-supremicist rulers of these globalizing nations, given the metical resistance rising up against them, even as globalization’s technological, organizational, and economic capacity continues to expand (Barber 1996; Karenga 2002e, 2003a; Lusane 1997). There is great alarm when people who should "know" when they are defeated ridicule the assessment, refuse to be defeated or dispirited, and, on the contrary, intensify and diversify their struggles (Zepezauer 2002). Certainly the battlefields of Palestine, Venezuela, long suffering Haiti, and Chiapas, Mexico, along with other continuing emancipatory struggles everywhere, reaffirm the indomitable character of the human spirit and the durability and adaptive vitality of a people determined to be free, regardless of the odds and assessments against them. Indeed, they remind us that the motive force of history is struggle, informed by the ongoing quest for freedom, justice, power of the masses, and peace in the world. Despite "end of history" claims and single-super- power resolve and resolutions, these struggles continue. For still the oppressed want freedom, the wronged and injured want justice, the people want power over their destiny and daily lives, and the world wants peace. And all over the world-especially in this U.S. citadel of aging capitalism with its archaic dreams of empire-clarity in the analysis of issues, and in the critical determination of tasks and prospects, requires the deep and disciplined reflection characteristic of the personal and social practice we call philosophy. But this sense of added urgency for effective intervention is prompted not only by the critical juncture at which we stand but also by an awareness of our long history of resistance as a people, because in our collective strivings and social struggles we seek a new future for our people, our descendants, and the world. Joined also to these conditions and considerations is the compelling character of our self-understanding as a people, as a moral vanguard in this country and the world. For we have launched, fought, and won with our allies struggles that not only have expanded the realm of freedom in this country and the world but also have served as an ongoing inspiration and a model of liberation struggles for other marginalized and oppressed peoples and groups throughout the world. Indeed, they have borrowed from and built on our moral vocabulary and moral vision, sung our songs of freedom, and held up our struggle for liberation as a model to emulate. Now, self-understanding and self-assertion are dialectically linked. In other words, how we understand ourselves in the world determines how we assert ourselves in the world. Thus, an expansive concept of ourselves as Africans-continental and diasporan-and as Africana philosophers forms an essential component of our sense of mission and the urgency with which we approach it. It is important to note that I have conceived and written this chapter within the framework of Kausaida philosophy (Karenga 1978, 1980, 1997) Kawaida is a philosophic initiative that was forged in the crucible of ideological and practical struggles around issues of freedom, justice, equalitys, self-determination, conullunal power, self-defense, pan~African- ism, coalition and alliance, Black Studies, intellectual emancipation, and cultural recovery and reconstlouction. It continued to develop in the midst of these ongoing struggies within the life of the mind and stmggles iottbtn the life of the people, as well as within the context of the conditions of the world. Kawaida is defined as an ongoing synthesis of the best of xAfrican thought and practice in constant exchange tuttb tl3e 'U)()ltd. It characterizes culture as a unique, instructive and valuable way of being human in the world-as a foundation and framework for self-understanding and self-assertion. As a philosophy of culture and struggle, Kawaida maintains that our intellectual and social practice as Nricana activist scholars must be undergirded and informed by ongoing efforts to (1) ground our- selves in our own culture; (2) constantly recover, reconstruct, .and bring forth from our culture the best of what it means to be African and human in the fullest sense; (3) speak this special cultural truth to the world and (4) use our culture to constantly make our own unique contribution to the reconception and reconstruction of this country, and to the forward flow of human history.

#### Neurophysiological phobias and philias are malleable through habit forming---cohesion around institutional change solves.

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It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups.

There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions.

Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves.

Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions.

Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.)

Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them.

Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances.

The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices.

Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions.

Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers.

Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them.

A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress -- our progress -- would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better."

The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course, this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology. Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

#### Affect isn’t a basis for politics.

Richard Sherwin 15. New York Law School. “Too Late for Thinking: The Curious Quest for Emancipatory Potential in Meaningless Affect and Some Jurisprudential Implications.” *Law, Culture and the Humanities* 13: 1-13.

In the history of western culture we can point to three historic moments of epistemological de-centering. The Copernican revolution taught humanity that we do not dwell at the center of the universe. The Freudian revolution taught us that the ‘‘I’’ is a lonely island besieged on all sides by a raging sea of irrational, unconscious forces. Then quantum theory taught us that the universe is indeterminate: subject to uncanny chance operations. Affect theory, perhaps as an extension of the Darwinian evolutionary account of selective adaptation, humbles rationalist pretensions further by subordinating mind to material, bio-chemical processes. If thinking is always an after-thought, an after-the-fact construction, then we can never reliably account for how we’ve actually been affected by things and others in the world around us.

How oppressive never to escape the grip of contingent social constructs. How depressing, if endless deconstruction yields only more fragmentation. Surely something must abide, some Higgs Boson-like elementary particle that can withstand deconstruction’s powerful blows. Is there anything real enough to withstand critique? Is there any basis left to hope for emancipation from the destabilizing mutability of human fabrication? In Brian Massumi’s view, there is. As he puts it: “The world always already offers degrees of freedom ready for amplification.”22 This takes us to the heart of the vitalist/ liberation impulse, namely: “escape from crystallized power structures.”23

In Massumi’s writings, affect operates as a cipher – a black box into which he can pack his emancipatory ideal.24 (“‘Affect’ is the word I use for ‘hope.’”25) What Massumi does not and perhaps cannot, or simply does not care to do is formulate a coherent basis for political judgment. While he at some points expresses a preference for “caring” and “belonging,”26 he offers no basis in affect theory for why those forms of behavior are preferable to other perhaps more intense alternatives, such as “anger” and “shock,” which he also embraces.27 But choices must be made. As Martha Nussbaum has noted, a society that cultivates conditions of anger and disgust, for example, is different from one that promotes empathy, dignity, and love.28

Massumi is enamored of the anti-structural,29 the spontaneous emergent process that Deleuze called “pure immanence.” But with affective intensity as his ultimate value30 Massumi remains trapped in a double bind. No critical judgment is forthcoming so long as intensity may be amplified.31 Because of this Massumi cannot coherently critique manifestly oppressive political structures (such as futurism, Nazism, and other intensity-fueled political regimes). How could he if the masses have opted to embrace such regimes for the intensity they provide?

Massumi’s resistance to making judgments is consistent with his theory, which minimizes to the vanishing point the human capacity for choice. For Massumi, the very notions of ‘‘individual will’’ and ‘‘subjective reflection’’ are a fiction. (“There is no individual outside its own trans-individual becoming.”32) Body is always conditioning mind – presumably without our conscious awareness. In the end, “events decide.”33 What could human freedom mean under such conditions?

The upshot is plain: in Massumi’s politics of affect, human freedom loses its capacity to signify. Choices are a fiction, and in any event no apparent normative basis exists for affirming, much less institutionalizing a preferred set of power structures. Affective intensity lacks structure by definition. Indeed, that is its appeal. (“Intensity is a value in itself.”34) But as Anthony Kronman has eloquently argued, without coherent structures, the legal, political, and cultural conditions necessary for the meaningful exercise of freedom (including political judgment) are unlikely to emerge – and if they do, they are unlikely to be sustainable.35 The latter point is borne out by the very political events that Massumi identifies as exemplary of his theory. If the “Arab Spring” and the “Occupy Movement”36 illustrate anything it is the effervescence of political action based on spontaneous intensity. In the absence of adequate political structures, this kind of political action is destined to pass with the next day’s tide.

The emancipatory cri du coeur that can be heard echoing in the work of cultural theorists like Massumi may have landed on “trans-individual” affect as the intensive Higgs Boson wave-particle of political science. Its indeconstructability promises freedom from subjective and cultural contingency – the prison house of “crystallized power structures.” But there is a price to be paid. The radical devaluation of reflective consciousness produces a species of freedom that signifies nothing. Perhaps this is what it is like to embrace a Zeitgeist of “de-humanism.”37

In Massumi’s politics of affect we can discern the impetus for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ ideology. As Ben Anderson writes: “There is always already an excess [affect] that power must work to recuperate but is destined and doomed to miss. It is that excess that is central to the creativity of bio-political production and thus the power of naked life.”38 Affect in this sense is “a movement of creative production” that always eludes capture. And this is what conveys a sense of its emancipatory power.39 The intensity of affect liberates us from bondage to contingent cultural entanglement.

Corporeal ontology precedes cultural epistemology. This move away from the centrality of cognition marks the demise not only of identity politics, but of identity itself, perhaps even of psychology.40 Simply stated, affect theorists like Massumi romanticize the unknowable “fluid materiality of excitable networks” as a way of disrupting familiar social and cultural hierarchies.41 In so doing, they elevate raw process over social and cultural regimentation and subjugation. It is the neurobiological equivalent of Rousseau’s primitive origin of society, an updated version of the Romantics’ myth of enchantment. If only questions about freedom and responsibility for shared values, justice included, could be resolved by so simple an expedient as the vitalist/liberation category shift from human agency to ‘‘trans-individual affective process.’’ Much can be learned about the various forms of political violence that affective intensity has assumed over the course of human history. But one needn’t take the historical path to discern trouble for Massumi’s emancipatory project. One can start with neuroscience itself.42

Theorists like Massumi play down (as they must) a variety of obstacles that stand in the way of affective emancipation: from the constraints of evolution to the biological programming of the amygdala itself.43 Indeed, what constitutes ‘‘fearfulness,’’ for example, depends upon programming the amygdala based on a habituated pattern of external stimuli.44

There are other problems as well. For instance, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the question of how communication occurs among different levels of the mind/body complex. As Steve Pile writes, for theorists like Massumi “affect is defined in opposition to cognition, reflexivity, consciousness and humanness.”45 Feelings, on the other hand, occupy a space between non-cognitive affect and highly socialized emotions. Feelings in this sense are pre-cognitive (“a response to transpersonal affects”).46 Our response to affects personalizes them. Through feelings we associate affects with the subject who experiences them. For their part, emotions reflect a shift from pre-cognitive subjectivity to the cognitive domain of socially constructed experience.47 Emotions, in this sense, are how I interpret what I’m feeling through language and other representational or cultural symbolic practices.

Affect theorists like Massumi insist that my choices and perhaps even my feelings may turn out to have nothing to do with the affect my body has already processed without my knowing it. This view preserves the purity of affective intensity by keeping it free of subjective or social significance. If you are in the ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ camp of affect theory along with Massumi, affect can never be symbolized, which means it can never be cognized. Affect, in this view, is always beyond consciousness. It’s like the dark matter that makes up the universe: we know it’s there, we just can’t say anything about it.

The problem for ‘‘vitalist/liberation’’ theorists like Massumi is that they want to eat their cake and have it too. Affects for them are ciphers – free-ranging radicals incapable of signifying. Yet, at the same time, many of these same theorists engage in searing critiques of those “in power” who use mass media along with other instrumentalities of affective manipulation for purposes of enhancing social or political control.48 The difficulty is this: If affect is being actively engineered to manipulate people’s behavior – whether in the form of habits of consumption, political judgments, or jury verdicts – it is incumbent upon the theorists to account for how exactly this manipulation is being carried out. As Pile cogently notes, how are the agents of affective manipulation able to “know the unknowable” sufficiently well to control their course and impact in society?49

Thrift’s recourse to metaphors such as “pipes and cables” is hardly sufficient to bear the burden of scientific explanation. Indeed, the nomenclature that has emerged to account for the engineering of affect – ranging from “affect flow between bodies,” “transmissions,” and “contagion”50 – all seem to suffer from the same fundamental lack of explanatory power. If we cannot know what affects are, it stands to reason that we cannot know how to control their flow and impact in society.

#### Necro-speculation is wrong---partial empathy is inevitable, and opting out is worse.

Gruen 17. Lori, William Griffin Professor of Philosophy, and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies and Science in Society, at Wesleyan University, “Expressing Entangled Empathy: A Reply,” Hypatia, Vol. 32, No. 2, Spring 2017, p. 452-462

Recently, I was asked by Frank Wilderson, whose work I much admire, why do I care? I got a better sense of the force of his question after reading his paper “‘Raw Life’ and the Ruse of Empathy.”2 In it Wilderson interrogates “an optimism that assumes relationality within and between all sentient beings.” His analysis is that there are some beings who are beyond relationality. “The explanatory powers of empathy and analysis are scandalized when confronted with the Black position, a paradigmatic location synonymous with slavery” (Wilderson 2013, 184). Following on the definition of slavery provided by Orlando Patterson as a permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons (Patterson 1988), Wilderson sees Blackness as a form of social death, a state of being deprived of relationality. So “even perceived moments of empathic identification with the Slave are ruses” (Wilderson 2013, 189), as one cannot empathize with objects or beings that are not in the relation. Further, he argues that if empathy is meant to facilitate and produce “civic relation and if anti-Blackness is the generative mechanism of this mode of production, then it becomes understandable how and why” (201) empathy is problematic. There are two concerns here; the latter is not unlike the worry that Debes raises about epistemic injustice, although in a different register. Debes says “dominant social groups trade on existing, ‘collectively’ shared—perhaps we should say, mainstream—forms of social understanding to reach self- and interpersonal understanding. And disempowered groups are pressed to conform to these normalized, mainstream social understandings” ($$). If these normalized understandings require, as Wilderson says, the social death of Black people, and these understandings are what entangled empathy is relying on, then it looks like entangled empathy is in the service of anti-Blackness and should thus be rejected. Debes is right insofar as this form of understanding is meant to be full understanding, and he is also onto something if the understanding required for entangled empathy inescapably emerges from mainstream “narrative tropes.” But I'm not sure why either needs to be the case. Trying to fully understand is not the same as actually achieving full understanding. Understanding among those on the margins happens all the time. Indeed, following the insights of Black feminists, often those on the margins understand more than those at the center, as they have opportunities for understanding both. What I take us to be doing when we are engaged in entangled empathetic moral attention is working through complicated processes of understanding one another and other animals in situations of differential social, political, and species-based power. Usually what we “get” is just a glimpse. We never really “know,” but too many people use the idea that we can't really know as an excuse to opt out of working at it. I take this to be a failure of both imagination and moral agency. The second worry will be something I continue to work out, and that is a more robust description of relationality. On the relational ontology I envisage, there is no place beyond relations; anti-Blackness or speciesism, for example, are political and ethical relations that view whites and humans as justified in regarding Blacks and animals as fungible, disposable, and perhaps paradoxically, outside of relationality. But as I've suggested, the relations we are in are not always, perhaps not even often, the sorts of things we choose. Some relations I am forced into, some I seek to develop, some are unjust, some are harmful, some may even seek to forever deprive me of my subjectivity. And since we are constituted in various ways by these relations, when some relations make it hard to see ourselves and others, entangled empathy will seem almost impossible. But that these relationships are part of us means that we can, indeed must, work with them and try to change them for the better.

#### Presenting concrete solutions is key---the Aff must scale up solvency.

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Critical IR theory needs to make more space for self-reflexivity and to open up to an epistemic transformation. The preceding discussion demonstrated that although peace and conflict studies are more pluralist than other critical IR branches, they are still affected by paradigmatic and disciplinary divides within IR. They operate in a conflictual theorizing logic that disregards certain ontological, methodological, and epistemological alternatives in order to remain loyal to one particular disciplinarity. For Laura Sjoberg (2017, 163–67), “disciplinarity has a narrowing effect,” suggesting that “an undisciplined IR would free space for more radical critique and more radical experimentation.” Disciplinary encampment among different branches of critical IR has suffocated the search for achievable emancipatory possibilities across a different range of cases. Endorsing alternativity requires a fluid onto-epistemology that would make it possible to bypass the epistemological entrapments caused by rigid academic rules of thought and of knowledge production and by the academic research process. Nonconflictual pathways of research would be beneficial for overcoming paradigmatic contempt, bypassing methodological holism and individualism, and making space for conciliatory heuristics and reality-congruent inquires (see Archer 1995; Hamati-Ataya 2018). Searching for nonconflictual critiques that are embedded in postparadigmatic logic means generating conceptually novel and reality-congruent knowledge about conflict-affected societies and the broader politics of international interventions. This should not be seen as an attempt to discipline the discipline of peacebuilding studies. On the contrary, it would be an attempt to break away from disciplinary entrenchments that have impeded a better understanding of complexity in postconflict societies. It would also be an attempt to avoid the normalization of entrenched research programs and open up the politics of knowledge production on peace, conflict, security, justice, and development.

More broadly, alternativity in critical IR theory needs to be rescued from never-ending conceptual reifications, which have ended up making ontological assentation about the world become completely detached from the world. In this regard, there is a growing realization in IR that “critique is a necessary but secondary task; the priority is to return to practical theory as quickly as possible” (Levine 2012, 69). Recalibrating the purpose of alternativity in critical theory requires recalibrating knowledge production, not only to unmask power relations and the dynamics of dominance and to create space for a politics of resistance but also to generate practical knowledge for political action that challenges, confronts, and disrupts existing power relations and offers alternative solutions for reshuffling social relations on more emancipatory and inclusive terms (see Duvall and Varadarajan 2003, 85; Murdie 2017; Deiana and McDonagh 2018). A feature of critical peace and conflict studies is a congruence between the emancipatory and problem-solving perspectives, which should be predicated on the conciliation of knowledge, the expansion of onto-politics of peace, and the pluralization of epistemological and methodological approaches. The recent methodological work by J. Samuel Barkin and Laura Sjoberg (2017) on interpretive quantification is a promising move toward this much-needed pluralist fertilization within critical theory. In particular, a stronger linkage between criticality, alternativity, and practicality could help critical security, peace, and conflict theories to offer alternatives that would maintain critical impetus while simultaneously strengthening ties to practical and societal problem-addressing solutions. Genealogical studies would blend well with a critical analysis of conceptual and policy alternatives (see Milliken 1999). Statistical analysis with an emancipatory hypothesis coupled with critical analysis would contribute to subverting policy practices and would normalize alternative knowledge about peace, justice, and emancipation.

The recent practice-turn in IR offers new bridges between scholars and practitioners, making it possible to translate critical knowledge into practice without compromising the normativity and criticality of scholarly works (see Bigo 2011). A forum on pragmatism published in this journal has implicitly highlighted the importance of alternativity in understanding global politics and generating impactful knowledge beyond the existing epistemological and methodological divides (see Hellmann 2009). Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, 701) have argued for “the orientation of research toward the generation of useful knowledge.” Practicality is essential for generating alternatives. For instance, Jonna Nyman (2016, 142) argues that “a pragmatic, practice-centred approach . . . can help us gain practical knowledge of how security works and understand the value of security better, as well as help us to suggest alternative possibilities.” Similarly, Navnita Chadha Behera (2016, 154) argues: “theorizing in IR needs to step out of the rarefied atmosphere of its academe, develop a healthy scepticism toward its canonical frames, and open up to the possibilities of learning from everyday life and experiences of people and their living traditions and practices.” Practicality shifts the focus from abstract criticality and normativity to contextual critiques that account for everyday practices and interactions. This would be essential for rescuing critique from becoming a postempirical endeavor.

Critical knowledge that engages with policy alternatives “is not only pragmatic, it is also politically enabling: it forces us away from instrumental problem-solving perspectives towards a wider framework of pragmatic thought where narrow instrumental goals are overridden by wider normative and political concerns” (Kurki 2013, 260). Such grounded critiques are crucial in order to expand non-prescriptive alternativity and exploring practical possibilities for social emancipation and change. For Steve Smith (2002: 202), “the acid test for the success of alternative and critical approaches is the extent to which they have led to empirically grounded work that explores the range and variety of world politics.” This would also be congruent with Daniel Levine's (2012, 30) concept of sustainable critique, which entails thinking in both practical and critical terms at once so that “IR could create a sustainably critical perspective on global politics that might then be turned back onto, and made to inform, ongoing policy debates and discourses.” Behera (2016, 154) further maintains that the “state-centric ontology of IR has effectively ended up dehumanizing the discipline in a way so that normally it has little to do with human relations, human needs, and the larger imperatives of humanity.” Generating practical alternatives would therefore require endorsing situated knowledge as an epistemological and methodological basis for any engagement with the real world. The work of feminists such as Donna Haraway (1988, 584) on situated standpoints is also relevant here because they offer “more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world.” Situated knowledge is, mostly, nonrepresentational knowledge, in that it is not firmly mediated through preexisting discourses. In this regard, promoting subjugated knowledge discourses and practices could be central to rejuvenating the emancipatory commitment of critical theory (see Doty 1996).

Situated alternatives could derive from emplaced and embodied knowledge and could have a more emancipatory character as they “bring forth the importance of recognizing, valuing, and employing marginalized voices by working from this perspective, as well as by reshaping research to include marginalized communities as part of knowledge production” (McHugh 2015, 62). For Robson and McCartan (2016, 3), “real world research looks to examine personal experience, social life and social systems, as well as related policies and initiatives. It endeavours to understand the lived in reality of people in society and its consequences.” Milja Kurki's (2013, 245) recent study of democracy promotion has approached alternativity from the perspective of policy provocations, which focus “on not prioritising one or another perspective, but rather on encouraging self-reflection by all practitioners, which in turn is considered as a key condition of seeking adequately pluralism-fostering reforms in concrete policy frameworks.” Kurki (2013, 248–51) further maintains that “instead of relying on objective knowledge and criteria, policy process can and should be attuned to the logic of interpretive, politicised and participatory judgements.” Her study is an excellent example of pragmatic congruence between criticality and alternativity, whereby policy alternatives are not geared toward totally improving or enhancing the current system but openly promote more pluralistic, reflexive, and emancipatory policies for democratization and peacebuilding.

Moreover, for these new grounds of critical alternativity to be introduced in practice, knowledge production should be decentered, decolonized, and “de-methodolised” (see Lisle 2014). R. B. J. Walker (2002, 265) has argued that “the key achievement of supposedly alternative and critical literatures over the past two decades has been to open up at least some possibility of asking questions about the location and character of the political.” As elaborated in this study, knowledge production in peace and conflict studies is predominantly based on Western epistemologies, which are shaped by specific cultures of thought, self-perpetuated epistemological superiority, and codified academic practices. Most of the international scholarship on postconflict societies derives from an unrepresentative body of knowledge, which tries to mediate, deviate, reinterpret, and, consequently, construct a different social reality that is interpreted through different measurements, reference points, and analytical concepts (see Latour 2005). This has greatly limited the possibility for proposing realizable alternatives. Due to these epistemological anomalies, there are growing calls in scholarship to decolonize knowledge from Eurocentric and Western dominance and instead to pursue more pluralist and particularist modes of knowledge (Smith 2012). For instance, Acharya and Buzan (2010, 2) have argued that IR theory should be “an open domain into which it is not unreasonable to expect non-Westerners to make a contribution at least proportional to the degree that they are involved in its practice.” Similarly, Andrew Hurrell (2016, 151) has proposed that “the pathway to a global IR will need to look beyond ‘IR’ and is likely to require new models for organizing social science research and knowledge production.” Decolonized epistemologies of peace would reverse the order of knowledge, placing the local first and then the regional and international as spatial and ontological scales for understanding peace processes (Visoka 2017). They would not operate in isolation but would engage in shaping global IR knowledge. Therefore, a genuine search for achievable alternatives should try to decolonize peace knowledge from Western and Eurocentric frameworks, interrogate decolonized knowledge and agencies, and explore the joint constitution of international intervention and local resistance (see Smith 2012; Memmi 2006). Local scholars often have rich knowledge, but the primary usage of it is not for instrumental purposes or for transferring and sharing with audiences of outsiders. Local knowledge is very much used to respond to narrow practical and everyday interests and needs and, as such, is embedded in the logic of generating sufficient knowledge to respond to specific circumstances.

In the context of peacebuilding, as examined in this article, generating alternatives from the ground up has the potential to bring about more sustainable forms of peace and reconciliation for groups and societies affected by violent conflict. Situated alternatives for emancipatory peace are more prone to avoiding co-optation by positivist and problem-solving epistemic predators, resulting thus in developing pluriversal political and peace orders beyond liberal peacebuilding and other Eurocentric impositions. From this situated perspective, emancipation could take the shape of “the transformation of structures and relationships of vulnerability through localized political action, aimed at the creation of spaces in people's lives so that they are enabled to make decisions and act beyond mere survival” (Basu and Nunes 2013, 69). Emancipatory alternatives would not be universal in their applications because such an attempt is not viable. Rather the focus should be on searching for practical emancipatory possibilities within a given context, time, space, and place (see Fierke 2007, 24). In other words, critiques with an adequate dose of alternativity are more likely to generate globally understandable and locally impactful knowledge. Nevertheless, alternativity does not necessarily have to be predicated on representative views of the world—it can also be a by-product of performing hope and imagined possibilities in global politics. Shapiro (2013, xiv) argues that critical thinking helps to “create the conditions of possibility for imaging alternative worlds.” That said, as the purpose of critical theory is emancipatory change, any alternative theoretical and empirical observation in service of improving the human conditions should generate a morally and practically acceptable standpoint. Because any attempt to establish an alternative interpretation inevitably “empowers a particular social and political standpoint” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 261). According to Ní Mhurchú and Shindo (2016, 5), “critique can help us to develop different ways of talking about, evaluating, doing and interrogating the changing nature of politics, relations and experiences of the international in a globalising world.” Hence, critique is inevitably implicated in world-making and, with a much clearer understanding of alternativity, can steer the thrust for world-changing in a more emancipatory, just, and inclusive direction.

Conclusion

Emancipation is a central feature of critical IR debates, but scholars often fail to develop alternatives or solutions achieving emancipation in practice. This article has examined the relationship between criticality and alternativity in IR in order to shed light on some of the most contested issues of critical theory, namely, the epistemological pathways for identifying the inconsistencies and flaws in existing knowledge and practices and the extent to which critical knowledge should generate alternative emancipatory possibilities. The article has argued that alternativity provides an opportunity for critical scholars to remain relevant without being affiliated with positivist logics of inquiry. In unpacking the conceptual contours, the article first explored how different branches of critical IR engage with the episteme of alternativity. The analysis found that although alternativity is often affiliated with problem-solving epistemologies, it has played a major role in shaping critical knowledge in IR. While this is acknowledged and endorsed at the epistemological level by a branch of critical scholars who engage in normative and reconstructive modes of critique, other scholars embedded in deconstructive modes of critique have disregarded the merits of alternativity in IR. The article has argued that, contrary to what is often assumed, alternativity is not incompatible with deconstructive or reconstructive critiques across different subdisciplines of IR. Yet critical IR debates, which have now become the new mainstream in IR, have failed to engage with the episteme of alternativity in a more empirical and practical sense. They preach emancipation but fail to develop tangible emancipatory alternatives.

As a result, there is a growing realization that, without tangible alternativity, critical theory risks losing its normative impetus and its ethical and emancipatory commitment, potentially becoming a post-epistemological vocation without politics. Critical knowledge without a dose of alternativity may examine the causes and consequences of subject matters but could fall short of reaching out to the wider policy community and the affected subjects where power relations reside, thus missing the opportunity to transform the structural, discursive, and performative practices that reproduce violence, inequality, and injustice on human and nonhuman ecology. To bridge this epistemological gap, the analysis in the second part of this article examined how alternativity features in peace and conflict studies, a disciplinary field known for adding normative, empirical, and practical substance to critical IR debates. The analysis offered a conceptual scoping of three modes of critique and alternativity in peace and conflict studies. The three modes of critique showed that a conjunction between criticality and alternativity is possible and that it is necessary to renew the practical and emancipatory potential of critical theory in IR. The three modes of alternativity in peace and conflict studies expose a spectrum of different critiques, ranging from those perspectives that disengage completely from conceptual and empirical alternatives, to more pragmatic and prescriptive approaches.

Critique-without-alternative represents one strand, which tends to avoid offering normative and practical alternatives to their critical reflections aimed at maintaining the conservative and radical impetus of critical theory and dissociating from problem-solving and policy-relevant methods of inquiry. This mode of critique is committed to revealing the weaknesses of peacebuilding interventions but refuses to offer any emancipatory and practical alternative on how to build sustainable peace after violent conflict. If the end goal of critical perspectives is achieving emancipation, then critique should not only be directed toward problematizing dominant discourses, practices, and policies but also needs to envisage political and practical alternatives rooted in ideational and material elements. In turn, the lack of an explicit emancipatory agenda limits their social and political impact and unintentionally validates the existing order. In response to this challenge, a new mode of critique has emerged, namely, critique-as-alternative, which exemplifies the optimal approach. Proponents of critique-as-alternative have remained committee to critical analysis, but most importantly, they have taken up the challenge of offering emancipatory knowledge that has practical relevance for vulnerable societies in global politics. Their main flaw, however, has been their inability to elaborate sufficiently their practical and emancipatory alternatives—a flaw that has opened up space for epistemic contestation and policy co-optation. Finally, the third mode of critique—critique-with-alternative—which is embedded in a positivist, problem-solving, and policy-driven logic of inquiry, offers alternatives that seek either to verify existing knowledge and the existing interventionary order or to reject other critical alternatives.

Looking at different modes of critique through the lens of alternativity in IR's subdiscipline of peace and conflict studies has provided interesting insights on the promise and limits of critical IR in shaping global politics. The analysis found that existing modes of critique have failed to develop elaborative emancipatory alternatives at both the conceptual and the practical levels. To infuse critique-with-alternative with emancipatory elements, expand the epistemological scope of critique-without-alternative, and operationalize further the practical solutions offered by this mode of critique, substantial changes are needed. This article has suggested exploring postparadigmatic approaches of inquiry in order to avoid existing epistemological entrapments and limitations, reclaiming the practical relevance of critical theory through pragmatic, reflexive, and situated alternatives—across the conceptual, normative, and empirical spectrums—and promoting decolonized, bottom-up methods of knowledge production. The existing modes of critique require pursuing more nonconflictual and postparadigmatic epistemologies, embracing situated knowledge and reclaiming and expanding its practical relevance, breaking away from geo-epistemological hierarchies, and opening up to post-Western IR. To conclude, promoting alternativity has the potential to rejuvenate critical scholarship embedded in the ethos of impactful engagement with the world without being co-opted by the policy world. The next challenge for scholars should not be whether alternativity and criticality are congruent but how emancipatory alternatives can renew the social and political purpose of critical theory and make an impact in the real world.

#### Micropolitics fail---if they’re right that power is a structural constraint, they can’t articulate new modes of existence.

Bayet 13, PhD, Catherine and Bruce Bastian Professor of Global and Transnational Studies at the Department of Sociology, University of Illinois, (Assef, Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Second Edition, Stanford University Press, pg. 41-46)

The dearth of conventional collective action—in particular, contentious protests among the subaltern groups (the poor, peasants, and women) in the developing countries, together with a disillusionment with dominant socialist parties, pushed many radical observers to "discover" and highlight different types of activism, however small-scale, local, or even individualistic. Such a quest, meanwhile, both contributed to and benefited from the upsurge of theoretical perspectives, during the 1980s, associated with poststructuralism that made micropolitics and "everyday resistance" a popular idea. James Scott's departure, during the 1980s, from a structuralist position in studying the behavior of the peasantry in Asia to a more ethnographic method of focusing on individual reactions of peasants contributed considerably to this paradigm shift.27 In the meantime, Foucault's "decentered" notion of power, together with a revival of neo-Gramscian politics of culture (hegemony), served as a key theoretical backing for micropolitics, and thus the "resistance" perspective. The notion of "resistance" came to stress that power and counterpower were not in binary opposition, but in a decoupled, complex, ambivalent, and perpetual "dance of control."28 It based itself on the Foucauldian idea that "wherever there is power there is resistance," although the latter consisted largely of small-scale, everyday, tiny activities that the agents could afford to articulate given their political constraints. Such a perception of resistance penetrated not only peasant studies, but a variety of fields, including labor studies, identity politics, ethnicity, women's studies, education, and studies of the urban subaltern. Thus, multiple researchers discussed how relating stories about miracles "gives voice to popular resistance";29 how disenfranchised women resisted patriarchy by relating folktales and songs or by pretending to be possessed or crazy;-"-1 how reviving extended family among the urban popular classes represented an "avenue of political participation."31 The relationships between the Filipino bar girls and Western men were discussed not simply in terms of total domination, but in a complex and contingent fashion;32 and the veiling of the Muslim working woman has been represented not in simple terms of submission, but in ambivalent terms of protest and co-optation—hence, an "accommodating protest."33 Indeed, on occasions, both veiling and unveiling were simultaneously considered as a symbol of resistance. Undoubtedly, such an attempt to grant agency to the subjects that until then were depicted as "passive poor," "submissive women," "apolitical peasant," and "oppressed worker" was a positive development. The resistance paradigm helps to uncover the complexity of power relations in society in general, and the politics of the subaltern in particular. It tells us that we may not expect a universalized form of struggle; that totalizing pictures often distort variations in people's perceptions about change; that local should be recognized as a significant site of struggle as well as a unit of analysis; that organized collective action may not be possible everywhere, and thus alternative forms of struggles must be discovered and acknowledged; that organized protest as such may not necessarily be privileged in the situations where suppression rules. The value of a more flexible, small-scale, and unbureaucratic activism should, therefore, be acknowledged.31 These are some of the issues that critiques of poststruc-turalist advocates of "resistance" ignore.3' Yet a number of conceptual and political problems also emerge from this paradigm. The immediate trouble is how to conceptualize resistance, and its relation to power, domination, and submission. James Scott seems to be clear about what he means by the term: Class resistance includes a«/act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (tor example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by superordinatc classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-a-vis these superordinate classes.36 (emphasis added) However, the phrase "any act" blocks delineating between qualitatively diverse forms of activities that Scott lists. Are we not to distinguish between large-scale collective action and individual acts, say, of tax dodging? Do reciting poetry in private, however subversive-sounding, and engaging in armed struggle have identical value? Should we not expect unequal affectivity and implications from such different acts? Scott was aware of this, and so agreed with those who had made distinctions between different types of resistance—for example, "real resistance" refers to "organized, systematic, preplanned or selfless practices with revolutionary consequences," and "token resistance" points to unorganized incidental acts without any revolutionary consequences, and which are accommodated in the power structure.37 Yet he insisted that the "token resistance" is no less real than the "real resistance." Scott's followers, however, continued to make further distinctions. Nathan Brown, in studying peasant politics in Egypt, for instance, identities three forms of politics: atomistic (politics of individuals and small groups with obscure content), communal (a group effort to disrupt the system, by slowing down production and the like), and revolt (just short of revolution to negate the system).38 Beyond this, many resistance writers tend to confuse an awareness about oppression with acts of resistance against it. The fact that poor women sing songs about their plight or ridicule men in their private gatherings indicates their understanding of gender dynamics. This does not mean, however, that they are involved in acts of resistance; neither are the miracle stories of the poor urbanites who imagine the saints to come and punish the strong. Such an understanding of "resistance" fails to capture the extremely complex interplay of conflict and consent, and ideas and action, operating within systems of power. Indeed, the link between consciousness and action remains a major sociological dilemma." Scott makes it clear that resistance is an intentional act. In Weberian tradition, he takes the meaning of action as a crucial clement. This intentional-ity, while significant in itself, obviously leaves out many types of individual and collective practices whose intended and unintended consequences do not correspond. In Cairo or Tehran, for example, many poor families illegally tap into electricity and running water from the municipality despite their awareness of their behavior's illegality. Yet they do not steal urban services in order to express their defiance vis-a-vis the authorities. Rather, they do it because they feel the necessity of those services for a decent life, because they find no other way to acquire them. But these very mundane acts when continued lead to significant changes in the urban structure, in social policy, and in the actors' own lives. Hence, the significance of the unintended consequences of agents' daily activities. In fact, many authors in the resistance paradigm have simply abandoned intent and meaning, focusing instead eclectically on both intended and unintended practices as manifestations of "resistance." There is still a further question. Docs resistance mean defending an already achieved gain (in Scott's terms, denying claims made by dominant groups over the subordinate ones) or making fresh demands (to "advance its own claims"), what 1 like to call "encroachment"? In much of the resistance literature, this distinction is missing. Although one might imagine moments of overlap, the two strategies, however, lead to different political consequences; this is so in particular when we view them in relation to the strategies of dominant power. The issue was so crucial that Lenin devoted his entire What Is to Be Done? to discussing the implications of these two strategics, albeit in different terms of "economism/trade unionism" vs. "social democratic/party politics." Whatever one may think about a Leninist/vanguardist paradigm, it was one that corresponded to a particular theory of the state and power (a capitalist state to be seized by a mass movement led by the working-class party); in addition, it was clear where this strategy wanted to take the working class (to establish a socialist state). Now, what is the perception of the state in the "resistance" paradigm? What is the strategic aim in this perspective? Where does the resistance paradigm want Lo lake its agents/subjects, beyond "preventing] the worst and promising] something better"?40 Much of the literature of resistance is based upon a notion of power that Foucault has articulated, that power is everywhere, that it "circulates" and is never "localized here and there, never in anybody's hands."'11 Such a formulation is surely instructive in transcending the myth of the powerlessness of the ordinary and in recognizing their agency. Yet this "decentered" notion of power, shared by many poststructuralist "resistance" writers, underestimates state power, notably its class dimension, since it fails to see that although power circulates, it does so unevenly—in some places it is far weightier, more concentrated, and "thicker," so to speak, than in others. In other words, as a system of power. It is, therefore, not accidental that a theory of the state and, therefore, an analysis of the possibility of co-optation, are absent in almost all accounts of "resistance." Consequently, the cherished acts of resistance float around aimlessly in an unknown, uncertain, and ambivalent universe of power relations, with the end result an unsettled, tense accommodation with the existing power arrangement. Lack of a clear concept of resistance, moreover, often leads writers in this genre to overestimate and read too much into the acts of the agents. The result is that almost any act of the subjects potentially becomes one of "resistance." Determined to discover the "inevitable" acts of resistance, many poststructuralist writers often come to "replace their subject."42 While they attempt to challenge the essentialism of such perspectives as "passive poor" "submissive Muslim women," and "inactive masses," they tend, however, to fall into the trap of essentialism in reverse—by reading too much into ordinary behaviors, interpreting them as necessarily conscious or contentious acts of defiance. This is so because they overlook the crucial fact that these practices occur mostly within the prevailing systems of power.

#### Debate can be a vehicle for change – just because change is not immediate doesn’t mean it impossible.

Palczewski 19 Catherine Helen Palczewski, Professor of Communication Studies and former Director of Debate @ University of Northern Iowa. A Personal/Political Case for Debate Philosophy & Rhetoric Volume 52, Number 1, 2019 Penn State University Press https://muse.jhu.edu/article/721923

On 26 May 2015, four seventh- and eighth-grade students spoke to the Portland Public Schools (PPS) Board of Education about their district's dress code (Porter 2016). Jeffrey Roberts testified about how the code stereotypes boys as distractible and how the prohibition on jerseys and sagging targeted specific students based on race. Hailey Tjensvold and Anna Loisa Cruz testified about the double standard that resulted in 100 percent of the students sent home being girls. Sophia Carlson argued the message sent to girls was that "hiding her body is more important than her education. . . boys are more entitled to their education than she is." The arguments presented by the students persuaded the school board to form a committee of students, parents, teachers, and administrators to create a code "fair and nondiscriminatory to all students" (McCombs 2017).

Lisa Frack, Oregon NOW board president, was at the school board meeting and had been developing a model dress code. Frack, along with Carlson and NOW board vice-president Elleanor Chin, served on the PPS Board of Education committee, which met for two hours every month for a year. The PPS Board of Education adopted a new code, based on the Oregon NOW model, in June 2016.

The debate was not contained to Oregon. In August 2017, Evanston Township High School (ETHS) in Illinois updated its dress code based on the Oregon NOW model after a student advisor to the school board found it online. ETHS district superintendent Eric Witherspoon had "heard from our students that their ability to be inspired to learn was directly impacted by their daily experiences with dress code enforcement because of their gender identity or expression, racial identity, cultural or religious identity, [End Page 89] body size, or body maturity" (quoted in McCombs 2017). As administrators reviewed the data, they found it "supported the students' claims of being disciplined disproportionately across racial and gender lines" (McCombs 2017).

This example illustrates a few things about debate.

First, debate is still possible and still matters. The students' arguments persuaded a group with the power to change policy. Then, people with different power positions and different interests (students, administrators, teachers, parents, community members) worked together to develop a solution.

Second, debate depends on people's willingness to consider claims supported by data. After students at ETHS claimed that the dress code was inequitably enforced along racial and gender lines, administrators found that the data regarding disciplinary actions supported these claims. Debate is possible when people are willing to consider changing their positions and subscribe to the rules of the game (i.e., that arguments require evidence).

Third, debate depends on extended interactions over time. Changing the dress code took hundreds of hours of work over months of meetings. Woman suffrage took over seven decades of debates. That does not mean that change is impossible. Instead, it means that change requires debate, deliberation, input from affected parties, and careful balancing of costs and benefits. Debate's extended interactions require patience and persistence. Just because you (think you) are right does not mean that people will automatically stop doing something or start doing something else. Winning the debate is only the first step in changing attitudes and behaviors.

Fourth, although public policy has personal impacts, debate encourages a systemic, and systematic, view rather than a personal one. For example, the individual students could have simply resorted to a personal solution, such as changing their clothing or having their parents talk to the principal. Instead, the students talked to each other, identified a systemic problem with the code and its implementation, and introduced the topic for public deliberation. They sought an institutional change that enabled them to achieve personal goals of self-expression and educational achievement.

It is possible for data to convince others (like a school's administration) that their implementation of policy is discriminatory and that it needs to be changed. It is possible to convince institutions (like school boards) to change their policies. It is possible for those who disagree to work toward a solution. Although we are in a political climate where reasonable argument and evidence (for example, of death tolls from Hurricane Maria in [End Page 90] Puerto Rico) seem to matter less, and political affiliation matters more, this example ought to give hope. 2

# 1NR

## Case

### Humanism Good---2NC

#### Rejecting the human is bad---their research de-mobilizes black and indigenous movements that are re-purposing the human in the Global South to galvanize movements against warming---that’s Karenga. Global warming independently causes extinction and turns case---it is impossible to strategize for their method if you are dying of battle fatigue. Proves that it’s try-or-die to center the human, not throw it away.

### Necro-Speculation---2NC

#### Discussing suffering in debate is good---motivates action to resolve---links harder to them because they offer descriptions of racial terror without a mechanism to resolve it---1NC Gruen says that Black Feminists have reworked necro-speculation and argued that it’s better to engage because refusing it causes white people to opt out.

## K

### 2NC---OV

#### Capitalism outweighs---

#### 1---Extinction---ocean acidification, resource shortages, and deforestation zero survival

#### 2---Climate Apartheid---those least responsible are at the frontlines of the crisis---makes it impossible for black people to physically survive

#### Turns case---reduces black malpractice into a commodity through alienation

Robinson 14 – Professor of sociology at UC Santa Barbara [William, *Global capitalism and the crisis of humanity*, Cambridge Univ. Press, pp. 222-4]

How viable are transformative strategies based on the notion that local communities can withdraw from global capitalism? The attempt to create alter- native communities at the local level, to set up cooperatives, to decentralize circuits of food supply, to withdraw from the global agro-industrial regime, to decentralize energy distribution and consumption, and to construct cooperative enterprises and local solidarity economies are necessary and important. Yet they do not in themselves resolve the problem of power. In the absence of a strategy to confront the state and to transform the system from within we are left with the dangerous illusion that the world can be changed without resolving this matter of power. Global capitalism is now internal to practically all communities on the planet. It has spun webs of worldwide interdependency that link us all to a larger totality. Global capitalism is indeed totalizing. The notion that one can escape from global capitalism not by defeating it but by creating alternative spaces or islands of utopia ignores the unpleasant fact that no matter how one wills it to be so, these spaces cannot disengage from capitalism, if for no other reason than that capital and the state will penetrate – often forcibly – and continuously reincorporate these spaces.

Localized solutions are too piecemeal to confront the power of global capitalism – to change the global balance of class and social forces. There is no way to get around the fact that the TCC holds class power over humanity, and the TNS exercises multiple forms of direct, coercive power. The state exercises power over us. This fact will not go away by ignoring this power. It is illusory to suppose that it can be countered by constructing autonomous communities, which in fact are not autonomous because such communities cannot extricate themselves from the webs of global capitalism, and even if they could, in theory, the state would not allow them to; it would use the force of its law to reincorporate such communities. There is no getting around confrontation with the state, no avoiding a struggle to wrest state power away from capital, its agents and allies. The struggle to withdraw from global capitalism, no matter how important, must be coupled with a struggle to overthrow global capitalism, to destroy the transnational capitalist state.

### 2NC---AT: 2AC 1---Perm do Both

#### 1---No plan, no perm---the logic of opportunity cost doesn’t apply to K affs---the 1AC could’ve chosen any hypothetical action given non-adherence to the resolution, which means they should be held to the burden of the literal best possible option

#### 2---Philosophical competition---if we win that the core assumptions and/or orientation towards politics of the 1AC are flawed, then we should win mutual exclusivity of the alt---anything else makes K v K debates impossible because the aff can reframe constantly and avoid defending their method

#### 3---State-phobia link---the 1AC’s refusal to engage in state-level politics forecloses the possibility of an effective revolution---anything less than state seizure is incapable of punishing the capitalist class---material infrastructure like health care, military, and welfare control the working class, that’s Heron & Dean---we’re impact turning their argument that we shouldn’t have the state as a telos---prescribing what should happen is important, and we should work toward a praxis---when the 1AC says they affirm “that which hovers beyond state-sanctioned horizons of life,” there is an explicit tradeoff.

#### 4---Even if capitalism doesn’t perfectly map onto racism, addressing the intersection is worth endorsing the alt for---the question is not just what set of scholarship can best explain the violence that occurs, but also what strategy or praxis can materially reduce violence that is occurring---our critique is based on the distinction between describing events and prescribing solutions.

#### This also answers their argument about shifting the question of the ballot---the alternative is not just concerned with what happens in debate---it’s also about laying the groundwork for events that could occur outside of debate---there will never be a perfect 1-1 correlation between debate and the political, but that doesn’t mean it’s not valuable to endorse desirable strategies in debate.

### 2NC---AT: 2AC 2---Link Turn

#### There’s no link turn---black malpractice runs counter to material anti-capitalist challenges---these arguments also operate as perm answers---cross-apply them.

#### Pseudopolitics link---their distortion of Fanon’s “fact of blackness” precludes Black participation in politics and confines resistance to performance---that’s proven by their solvency argument about EDM---not only is it folded back into the capitalist superstructure and sold for profit, but it also means that the focus is not on breaking down white civilization, but merely accenting it at the periphery---that’s shown by academics who make money off theories of Blackness as external to civil society---this means that it’s necessary to begin resistance from within and use the state as an instrument to establish a Black Dictatorship---that’s Okoth.

#### Economization link---the language of anticompetitive activities and monopoly in debate brings the market into all aspects of life---neolib relies on the work of metaphor to reorient political and collective understandings away from challenging capital---that’s Zuidhof.

#### That creates disembodied cogito-economic subjects and turns the case.

Dr Carl Rhodes and Dr John Garrick 2, Rhodes is Professor of Organization Studies and Deputy Dean at UTS Business School, University Fellow in Law at Charles Darwin University, “Economic metaphors and working knowledge: enter the ‘cogito-economic’ subject,” Human Resources Development International, 5(1), 87-97, 2002.

Introduction

In this paper we ask the question: what are the effects of defining knowledge in economic terms? In addressing this question, we particularly look at how the language of commerce has appropriated knowledge by defining it in its own terms. We then examine the effects of the metaphorical language that has emerged out of recent theorizations of knowledge, arguing that this has generated a powerful discourse that defines people as ‘cogito-economic subjects’. By defining people in this way, we suggest, there are potential dangers of metaphors becoming reified, such that knowledge becomes describable only in economic terms and people become describable only in cogito-economic terms. This implies that subjects are both ‘knowledge workers’ (cogito) and ‘human resources’ (economic). We propose that this represents a conflation of knowledge and commercial interests. We further argue that this can be problematic in so far as the conflation attempts to bring knowledge ‘under control’. In this way the people through whom such ‘working knowledge’ is mediated are meant to become more manageable. Indeed, the knowledge management systems of postindustrial organizations are, in part, both products and producers of this discourse.

With the advent of the post-industrial economy, knowledge has entered the workplace in ways that it never had before. The use of the term ‘post-industrialism’ itself is suggestive of ‘a shift in the structure of industrial capitalism away from mass production and bureaucracy and indicating changing technologies of production, a growth in the service sector and changes in the knowledge requirements of work’ (White and Jacques 1995: 48). Further, in post-industrial economies the management of work has also changed through the impact of information technology and the development of alternative organizational forms (Alvesson and Berg 1992). These new organizations in turn need people who do work in correspondingly new and different ways as, in the ‘knowledge economy’, work has become less physical and more discursive. Gee et al. aptly put it this way:

Contemporary, globally competitive businesses don’t any longer compete on the basis of their products or services per se. They compete, rather, on the basis of how much learning and knowledge they can use as leverage in order to expeditiously invent, produce, distribute and market their goods and services, as well as to innovatively vary and customize them. (Gee et al. 1996: 5)

Against this complex backdrop of such post-industrial work conditions, where might we epistemologically locate the ‘working knowledge’ that is now thought to be even more important than it was in the past? Further, how might we evaluate the effects of this form of knowledge? The emerging discourse of ‘working knowledge’ is indicative of a pragmatic turn in our orientation towards what counts as knowledge. Epistemologically, working knowledge is not only in work; it is what works. The question of what works is invariably a matter of judgement of the effect of knowledge on economic imperatives, with outcomes shaped by criteria such as economic growth, commercial projections and company research into areas such as consumer satisfaction. Working knowledge can, as a consequence, easily become a vehicle for forging particular policies or projects that represent dominant perspectives that are legitimated by commercial considerations. An important part of this legitimization is the employ- ment of a new language through which the knowledge requirements of the new economy are both articulated and created. This language employs terms such as ‘human capital’, ‘knowledge assets’, ‘the knowledge economy’, ‘the information economy’ and ‘knowledge workers’ to explore, define and create new ways of looking at knowledge. The way that knowledge is theorized has become increasingly mediated through economic, commercial and accounting metaphors such as ‘the balanced scorecard’ and ‘intangible assets’. In turn, these metaphors construct social understandings of working knowledge and professional practices.

The advent of knowledge work

Corporate managers and many academics have increasingly recognized professional knowledge as being ‘valid’ in its own right. It is knowledge that does not rely on validation established by scientific research, nor is it beholden to the legitimizing practices of the academy or the ‘research centre’. Working knowledge emanates from actually doing the work. In The Reective Practitioner, Schön (1983) convincingly argued that knowledge, of an action-oriented character, is embedded in professional activity and can be subject to real-time critical reection by professional practitioners. In Schön’s sense of practice, professional knowledge is potentially open-ended – even in its action elements – with reective abilities being pivotal. In this knowledge, good professional practice involves making and reecting on the best judgements in specic contexts, for ethical as well as commercial considerations. Work is both site and instrument of evaluating such working knowledge. The business world and the corporate sector in particular now encourage new, even critical, ideas (Drucker 1995) (although thoroughgoing critique, we would argue, continues to be largely discouraged). If ‘working knowledge’ is to be a coherent construction and not just a fashionable description of particular elements of technological-age work, or a disguise for purely technical and financial interests, it should follow that adequate avenues for reexivity need to be built into its production. This is a key challenge for the action-oriented research approaches now favoured by many organizations. Transparency, openness, critical self-reection, highly developed systems that promote peer assessment and review, and the development of professional associations that have contact with the academic world would be among possible components of a new epistemological ‘infrastructure’ for working knowledge. And there are signs that such components are beginning to take shape. Government higher education policies across European Union member nations, the US, Canada and Australia are actively encouraging new university–industry partnering arrangements emphasizing collaborative research between faculties and particular companies and flexible and work-based (as distinct from classroom-based) approaches to learning. What is at stake is both the character of what we take knowledge to be and, even more seriously, the extent to which we are moving towards – or away from – a more open society. In a global world saturated by information available through the Internet, openness may turn out to be one pragmatic option. In the ‘knowledge society’, the issue arises as to where an organization is positioned in terms of knowledge – with which knowledge networks is it connected (Castells 1997)? Barnett expands on this ‘positioning’, pointing out that: We are seeing the rise of corporate universities – such as that in the UK spawned by British Aerospace – but they are not noted for their sponsorship among their employees of receptivity to Greek philosophy or the nineteenth century novel. A knowledge audit would reveal that they focus on technical and managerial knowledge; and, even there, will want to develop among their employees certain usable knowledges – and their associated skills – with likely productive value for the organization. (Barnett 2000: 20) Such developments are indicative of changes in knowledge that are brought about by the new role that corporations play in knowledge production. This new role, in turn, shapes the relationships that people can have with the corporations where they are employed and works to impose limits on the subjectivities available to them. Edwards and Tait (2000) argue that this ‘willing’ employee entails ‘an active subjectivity’ – aligned to organizational goals – producing what Casey (1995) terms ‘designer employees’. As we pointed out in our introduction, in the context of post-industrial work conditions, the epistemological location of ‘working knowledge’ is indeed problematic. The advent of ‘working knowledge’ demonstrates a pragmatic orientation to knowl- edge, where knowledge is not only in work; it is what works(Garrick and Rhodes 2000: 8). Based on such pragmatism, the ‘working’ in knowledge can become a way to dene workplace practices that seek to reinforce and privilege ways of being and knowing that are judged illegitimate if they do not reect commercial interests. The danger here is not that knowledge can be of value to commercial interests in itself, but rather that commerce becomes the sole criterion for judging knowledge. For instance, with modern information and communications technologies (and the call from shareholders for greater accountability), new possibilities for openness and mutual evaluation are being generated, but nonetheless commercial discourses certainly remain dominant. As such, Lyotard’s question: ‘who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?’ (1984: 9) remains very pertinent to developing reexive approaches to knowledge work. Metaphors: signifying knowledge at work The very notion of ‘working knowledge’ is suggestive of a historicization that claims we have moved from an agrarian to an industrial and then, in the post-World War Two era, to a knowledge and information society. Hand in hand with the notion of the ‘knowledge society’ has come a new range of signiers used to dene people. Moving away from just referring to people as ‘workers’, ‘employees’ or ‘staff’, these new signiers rely heavily on terminology related to both economics and knowledge. One of the earliest examples of this was the idea of ‘human capital’ (Schultz 1961). Schultz’s argument was that much of what we call consumption constitutes investment in human capital – the productive capabilities of human beings. These capabilities, in Schultz’s human capital perspective, are acquired at a cost and, in turn, command a price in the labour market – the level of which depends on how useful they are in producing goods and services. Since then, there has been a proliferation of terms expanding on this basic premise to describe people in economic and/or knowledge terms. Such terms include ‘human resource development’ (HRD) and the related practices of ‘human resource management’ (HRM), ‘knowledge workers’, ‘intellectual capital’, ‘knowledge capital’ and, more recently, the managerial jargon of ‘employees are our greatest asset’. One common characteristic of this terminology is the use of economic metaphors such as capital, resources and assets to describe people at work. We believe that attention to the development of such metaphors is important as they provide valuable insights into life in commercial organizations. Palmer and Dunford (1996) also point out that some metaphors may be so embedded in particular contexts that they come to constitute an ‘authentic’ discourse that permits no flexibility or change in ways of looking at organizations and the people in them. Here attempts at introducing new ideas or metaphors might nd it hard not to be ‘colonized’ by existing dominant organizational metaphors. The notion of ‘human resources’ serves as a good example of part of such an ‘authentic discourse’ – one that has ‘graduated’ to now being a dead metaphor, that is, a metaphor whose metaphoricity is forgotten. The growth of the use of the term ‘human resources’ in popular management books, academic texts, management education subjects and the naming of functional departments in organizations has come to see the ‘human resource’ as being a dominant term used to refer to people in work organizations. The use of the term ‘resource’ to describe people here loses its metaphoric character and is readily seen as a literal term to describe people. The word ‘resource’, however, has a genealogy that relates back to the description of economic and nancial phenomena – where a resource refers to a means of producing wealth or property that can be converted into money. Here the use of the word ‘resource’ becomes a metaphor to describe people, but it is a metaphor borrowed from the corporate domain in which people are dened in terms of managerial prerogatives. Much of the terminology that has emerged to dene people in the postindustrial context uses this textual practice. Intellectual capital, knowledge capital and human capital are other prime illustrations, each working to dene people in terms of their central concept: capital itself. Capital is the wealth that is employed in order to produce goods and services, and people become linguistically subsumed as just another form of capital. The metaphor translates ‘being’ through the terminology of commerce – thus the cogito-economic subject.

The use of such metaphors to drive representations of people at work is a way of exerting control over the identities of those people. Defining people in particular terms and using particular metaphors foregrounds certain ways of understanding people and backgrounds others (Rhodes 2000) – in the case described here, the economic metaphors do this too, they draw attention to people as economic subjects (capital, assets, resources) that are inputs into an organizational system. This is a profound example of the politics of representation at work where overtly benign descriptions enact powerful controls over the subject positions open to people in particular social contexts. As Cooper puts it:

Technologies of representation convert the inaccessible, unknown and private into the accessible, known and public; they convert the deferred and faraway into the instantaneous and immediate; and their portability and mobility makes them easy to manipulate and control. (Cooper 1992: 267)

In terms of commercial organizations, Deetz has suggested that the development of industrialization replaced a set of representations based on ‘intrinsic’ values with one based on a system of exchange values represented by money. It is here that ‘labour became articulated as a “cost” to the organization’ (1995: 228). Deetz goes on to argue that, for the modern corporation, the reason for working is to make money and any alternative motives are considered only in terms of their effect on commitment, productivity and sales as translated in monetary terms. This is a privileging of a monetary code as a representation practice in which everything is economic: everything including people. Such privileging serves to enact a form of control through which economic subjects emerge out of the very interests that seek to define people in those (economic) terms.

In contemporary organization and management studies literature, definitions of people in economic terms have taken a further turn from that described by Deetz. The use of language such as ‘working knowledge’, ‘intellectual capital’, ‘knowledge assets’ and so forth takes the use of economic metaphor and adds to it another powerful linguistic substitution. The first turn is to use economic metaphor to describe people; the second turn is to introduce the synecdoche of knowledge and intellect. Synecdoche works in this way to use a part of something to describe the whole – it is people’s intellectual capacity and their knowledge that is used to describe their ‘whole’. The result is the creation of a disembodied subjectivity that defines people economically and focuses their ‘value’ in terms of their intellectual capacity – again as cogito-economic subjects. For instance, an economic person might be one whose person is knowledge. Deetz argues that such practices create a ‘closed politics . . . owing to a variety of practices which produce and privilege certain interests – principally managerial – in both public decision making and in the production of the type of person that exists in modern organizations and society’ (1995: 215). Our concern is that an arena is constructed where the only legitimate knowledge might be that which is deemed economically viable and the only legitimate subjectivity is one where people are defined in these terms.

Enter Jacques

Usure

In order to explore further how this play of metaphor works, this section of the paper will use Derrida’s (1982) discussion of the use of metaphor in philosophy to review analogously the use of cogito-economic metaphors to define selves. Derrida (1982) uses the term ‘usure’ to examine the use of metaphor in philosophy. He uses this term in relation to its double meaning in the French language – usure as usury (i.e. the acquisition of too much interest) and usure as using up or the deterioration through usage. The usure of metaphor, therefore, is simultaneously the rubbing away of the original and the creation of ‘linguistic surplus value’. A metaphor such as the ‘human resource’ can be used to illustrate this. In the metaphorical term ‘resource’ there is a suggestion that human resources were something else prior to the ‘resource’ metaphor being applied and becoming commonplace. It implies an original, concrete figure of a pre-economic subject, equivalent to what might have been considered the literal meaning of ‘being human’. The first move of the usure of metaphor, then, is to wear out an ‘original meaning’; for the metaphor to no longer be noticed and to be taken for the ‘proper’ meaning.1 The metaphor is used, ‘human resources’ is worn out as its apparent metaphoricity is suspended. People are no longer seen as resources but are resources.

At the same time as the wearing out occurs, the metaphor is also producing a surplus value – a ‘tropic supplementarity’ (Derrida 1982: 210): ‘The supplementary product of a capital, the exchange which far from losing the original investment would fructify its initial wealth, would increase its return in the form of revenue, additional interest, linguistic surplus value’ (1982: 210).

Here the distinction between the two parts of the word ‘usure’ is indistinguishable. There is a proliferation of the signifier that is created, as meaning is displaced from one term to another – for example from worker to resource. Describing people as workers focuses on their activity; as resource it focuses on their value to the enterprise. The usure of the metaphor thus creates a surplus of meaning. This is a supplement – a substitutive signification – ‘which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the “real” supervening, and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement’ (Derrida 1976: 7). Metaphor then creates surplus as one signier is replaced by another – in this case through the metaphor of person as signied as a ‘resource’: as well as what a person might have been before, now there is more; now a person is also a resource. The adoption of a new use of language to describe people is therefore not innocent. It is not just about using different words to signify the same thing. Rather, translating concepts from one signier to another (in our illustration from ‘person’ to ‘resource’) cannot be pure, transparent or unequivocal. Paraphrasing Derrida (1996), the meaning of a concept is not separable from the process of passage or from the signifying operation. The translation to the new signifier is generative – it is a supplement that does not just substitute for a signied or a previous signifier, but rather it emerges as something new. Describing people in cogito-economic terms therefore does not reflect the ‘reality’ of what it means to be a person, but rather it generates and potentially attempts to finalize that reality in a particular way.

We are not suggesting that the metaphor is ‘concrete’ so that it can be traced to its origins, for instance, to get at the true meaning of being a ‘person’. Our point, rather, is that the economic metaphor does work by producing and supplementing. But it does not replace a pre-metaphoric reality where people (subjects) were literal rather than gurative. Nor are we writing nostalgically; there is no turning back from the usure of metaphor. It follows that ‘working knowledge’ cannot be brought into question because it uses gurative language; but it can be questioned in terms of how it uses gurative language.

Scraped again

As we discussed earlier, post-industrial conditions and the so-called ‘information economy’ have further developed the economic metaphor by adding to it a knowledge element. This is a double substitution where an increasingly dominant way of looking at people is as cogito-economic subjects. The creation of the cogito-economic subject is the result of metaphor, but it is a metaphor without literal origin – a subject that cannot transcend its signiers. The debate then turns not to a longing for authentic experience, but to a discussion of the effects of the usure.

This effect is what Derrida describes (metaphorically) as a ‘palimpsest’. Palimpsest comes from the Greek meaning ‘scraped again’, and refers to a parchment, papyrus or other writing material where the original text has been removed so that it can be reused. Before paper became an easily available and inexpensive commodity, this common practice involved old surfaces being scrubbed so that they could be written on multiple times (Murn and Ray 1998). Despite this, even though the original text was scraped off, the older text is still recoverable by the use of means such as ultraviolet light. To consider a word a palimpsest draws attention to the multiple levels of signication that exist in that word. Despite the ‘scrubbing of meaning’ and its metaphorical replacement, a trace of what has been replaced always exists, ‘inscribed in white ink’. This is not to suggest that the meaning that has been replaced was in some way ‘original’ or non-metaphorical. Rather, one sign has been used to designate another in a chain of signification where new signs work to erode, rub out and use up the signs that they replace.

Working knowledge and the cogito-economic subject

Our argument is that contemporary times are seeing the cogito-economic subject emerging through a discourse that uses commercial language to re-write the palimpsest of the self. Indeed, the processes of industrialism have generated dominant discourses on selfhood that both ‘shape the character of the modern self throughout modern industrialism and delimit the context of our thinking on self’ (Casey 1995: 50). It is here that discursive processes of work shape industrial selves through a ‘hidden curriculum’ that produces ‘acculturated employees’(1995: 78). This type of economicself is constructed as desirable in the contemporary work order. Such a self is dened not as an autonomous object, but rather as a subject dened positionally and relationally. The question then changes from: ‘Who denes the terms of the organization to who is dened by them and how these denitions determine organizational identity?’(Baack and Prasch 1997: 136).

The cogito-economic self then exists in a discourse that works to define people in such terms and simultaneously rub out other forms of self, supplementing them with terms that resonate with organizational imperatives. In this way a discourse becomes powerful. When its metaphor is used up, people must contend with the emergent (powerful) discourse in terms of how they define themselves and are defined by others.

### 2NC---AT: 2AC 3---Textures DA

#### The Aff doesn’t solve it---there’s no explanation of how black malpractice prevents the gratuitous forms of violence that fall outside the explanatory range of capital---that means it’s not net offense for them.

#### It also doesn’t disprove our argument---the alt can solve this violence because even if the rationale behind those actions isn’t economic, the system that facilitates them is---in other words, it would be much harder for a white person to get away with being violent in that way if a Black Dictatorship with strong enforcement mechanisms against those practices were in power.

### 2NC---AT: 2AC 4---Production of Value

#### They said we only care about being anti-capitalist when it harms white people---that’s wrong---it’s impossible to definitively determine anyone’s intentions, and one of the most important reasons to endorse the alt is reducing the racialized violence capitalism inflicts.

#### Biological death might not be the only important form of death or outcome, but it is still relevant for our ability to implement and actualize any strategy to solve any form of violence---we’re winning that cap causes extinction, which is a floor for value and a pre-requisite to solving their impacts.

### 2NC---Alt

#### Vote negative for a political orientation toward Black Maoism---it’s a command-and-control government that incorporates race into its core ideology---they’ve conceded it solves capitalism via state seizure

### 2NC---AT: 2AC 5---Alt Fails

#### Alt solves and isn’t white socialism---

#### 1---Praxis---Black Maoism rejects the idea of “class versus race”---it mobilizes the global working class through a black communist vanguard party---their argument about transactions on stolen land assumes a white proletariat that the alt is not defending.

#### 2---History---Marxism is black-inclusive---sharecropper unions, Haymarket Square, and Fannie Lou Hamer all prove---refusing to seize political power in favor of cultural strategies like black malpractice fails.

Ferguson 15 (Stephen C., Assoc. Prof. in Liberal Studies @ North Carolina A & T State U., *Philosophy of African American Studies: Nothing Left of Blackness*, p. 7-14)

Marxism in Ebony Materialist Philosophical Inquiry and Black Studies In any academic discipline, there exist varying, oftentimes even conflicting, conceptual frameworks, theoretical approaches, and methods. Black Studies is no different. In light of the theoretical works prominent today, however, a number of students in AAS might easily conclude that philosophical idealism is the only school of thought. To the contrary, Black Leftist activists were significant players during the early period of Black Studies. The first introductory textbooks in African American Studies were written by Marxist/socialist scholars and activists; for instance, Peoples College's Introduction to Afro-American Studies and Clarence Munford's Production Relations, Class and Black Liberation: A Marxist Perspective in Afro-American Studies. Communist like Jack O'Dell and Robert Rhodes taught African American Studies courses at the Antioch College branch campus in Washington, D. C. And pioneering Black historian and "antibourgeois gadfly" Earl Thorpe - chair of the history department at North Carolina College - was recruited to teach courses on "Marxism and Black Liberation" for the Black Studies program at Duke University.23 However, today, Leftist thought is marginal to the politics and philosophy of Black Studies. Socialism and Marxism-Leninism are integral parts of African American history and culture. Of course, Marxist scholar/activists contributed to African American intellectual history and culture long before what is, in more formal terms, considered the advent of Black Studies during the late 1960s. In the tradition of Hubert Harrison, Susie Revels Cayton, Maude White Katz, Richard B. Moore, Paul Robeson, Oliver Cox, Eugene Holmes, Abram Harris, Claudia Jones, Walter Rodney, Angela Davis, and John McClendon, there is a need to bring the Black working-class-men and women-back into AAS. A materialist philosophy inquiry into Black Studies is grounded on three presuppositions. A materialist conception of epistemology and ontology presumes that there is a reality independent of our consciousness. A materialist ontology asserts the primacy of material reality over consciousness. And a materialist epistemology posits that this reality is knowable and knowledge or what is cognitive (social consciousness) corresponds to and thus ideally approximates this material reality. Lastly, a materialist philosophy presupposes that the social world is a stratified ontology of which class relations (i.e., social relations of production) form the ground for understanding social processes. The call for a materialist conception of science and epistemology should not be seen as a call for an essentialist ascription of AAS, wherein it is viewed only as a social scientific enterprise devoid of cultural studies. The current popularity of cultural studies, often in collaboration with various species of historicism and postmodernist trends, fosters a separation between cultural studies and social relations of production. As a school of thought, it gives less attention to the material conditions that give rise to African American culture and relativizes the objective character of the Black experience. In my estimation, the Black working-class has become lost in the whirlwind of cultural idealism. Contemporary Black cultural theory – under the spell of poststructuralism and Afrocentricity – has declared: class is dead! All that exists is intersectionality and a "matrix of domination," in which everyone is oppressed – women, men, capitalist, workers, children, ad infinitum. And there is a tendency in Black Studies to transform the Black workingclass into some obscure gray matter known as the consumer, the multitude, or – my favorite from the "friends of the poor" – the Black underclass.24 The relevance and importance of the Black working-class must be brought to the forefront of Black Studies.25 This would entail discarding analytical notions such as "cultural deprivation," "human capital," "culture of poverty," "nihilism," "feminization of poverty," "intersectionality," "underclass," "cultural pathology," and "menticide" that have served to explain the contemporary and historical crisis that confronts the Black working-class. We must discard the cultural idealism of Maulana Karenga, Corne! West, Jawanza Kunjufu, Marimba Ani, Patricia Hill Collins, Molefi Asante, and William Julius Wilson who perceive the "Negro Question'' as an ideological or axiological crisis, for example, as alienation from ancient African values, the loss of a "love ethic," or the lack of human capital. When we view the “Negro Question” as preeminently ideological, moral, or cultural, we ultimately discount the determinate role of material contradictions rooted in class contradictions. As Robert Allen astutely noted, " ... the question is not politics or no politics; rather it is which politics? Whom will Black Studies serve? Will it be truly democratic in its intellectual and political vision, or will it become 'apolitical' and acquiesce to a narrow, elitist and bourgeois view of education?"26 Black Studies and the Question of Western Civilization Revisited C. L. R. James wrote what could be considered a Marxist manifesto for Black Studies in 1969. Speaking at Federal City College, James argues, at the level of theory, that Black Studies should be anti-racist and anti-imperialist in character, but not anti-white. From James's perspective, there is no intellectual space in Black Studies for philosophies of Blackness in which ancient African civilizations, values, and cultural perspectives constitute a "presuppositionless beginning" for Black Studies.27 He parts company with Black nationalists and their contemporary progeny (e.g., Afrocentrists) who argue that every culture rests on a metaphysical, permanent substratum that gives rise to a particular system of thought. He cogently proclaims: We need a careful systematic building up of historical, economic, political, literary ideas, knowledge and information, on the Negro question ... Because it is only where we have Bolshevik ideas, Marxist ideas, Marxist knowledge, Marxist history, Marxist perspectives, that you are certain to drive out bourgeois ideas, bourgeois history, bourgeois perspectives which are so powerful on the question of the races in the United States.28 [Italics Added] For James, the antithesis between bourgeois ideology and proletarian ideology is essential to the development, direction, and aim of Black Studies. James is often viewed as someone who was head-over-heels in love with Western culture and/or civilization. Yet, it is important to note that dialectical and historical materialism (or Marxism-Leninism) constitutes the conceptual and theoretical framework for his assessment of "The Fate of Humanity." In a 1939 article, "Revolution and the Negro" James boldly avows, "What we as Marxists have to see is the tremendous role played by Negroes in the transformation of Western civilization from feudalism to capitalism. It is only from this vantage-point that we shall be able to appreciate (and prepare for) the still greater role they must of necessity play in the transition from capitalism to socialism."29 James's classic works such as The Black Jacobins and A History of Pan-African Revolt are ardently attentive to the fact that slavery, colonialism, and imperialism are part and parcel of capitalism. Moreover, the revolutionary resistance of people of African descent ostensibly indicates the critical role of Black people as actors or subjects of history and the dialectical development of Western civilization. In unswerving disapproval of Hegel's views about Africans and their place outside of world history, James meticulously documents and effectively demonstrates that-far from being removed from world historical event-African people and their descendants in the diaspora transformed the landscape of world history in a monumental fashion.3° Yet, James's historiography is not some form of racial vindicationism, which claims that ancient African civilization is the real source of Black historic magnitude and ultimately collective identity. Rather James offers insights into the Black struggles against slavery and colonialism as manifestations of the antagonistic contradictions within the modern (bourgeois) stage of world history. Cultural idealism has no place within James's worldview and consequently his philosophy of history. James's philosophy of history is not anti-European, anti-Western, or anti-white; his philosophy of history is stridently anti-slavery, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and anticapitalist.31 James introduces a conceptual distinction between what is European and what is Eurocentrism. Moreover, he did not accept the abstract concept of the West as monolithic, devoid of internal class relations and contradictory class interests. Black sociologist Alex Dupuy points out that James's dialectical analysis takes into consideration the tremendous value of European culture and its influence on the African diaspora, and vice versa.32 Dupuy argues, "James was redefining the meaning of Western culture away from its Eurocentric understanding. For [James], West Indians were a modern and Western people, though they were not European, a point [James] made in many of his writings, e.g., his semiautobiography, Beyond a Boundary (1963)." 33 James resolutely rejected any outlook that requires Black Studies to be grounded on a uniquely formulated Black perspective (e.g., Senghor's Negritude or Karenga's Kawaida or Asante's Afrocentricity). Dupuy points out that James does not "reject African culture in favor of Western culture." 34 Rather, James's analysis is based on "a historical materialist understanding of culture" and the recognition that "the predominant influences in the Caribbean were those of Western Europe."35 As Dupuy insightfully notes, "The Black ]acobins remains ... one of the most succinct critiques of the barbarism of Western European imperialism but also of the promise of bourgeois civilization."36 Any philosophy of AAS worth its salt should follow in the "Giant Steps" of C. L. R. James. Embracing an ethnophilosophy that is anti-European is as fruitful as masturbation. It may be pleasurable, perhaps even therapeutic, but it won't give birth to a scientific approach to Black Studies. "And that Black Fist becomes a Red Spark" Black Studies and Black Working-Class Studies37 In a post-Cold War world, the "spectre of communism" has apparently been exorcised and laid to rest. There is the widespread belief that we have witnessed the death-knell of Marxism. So, why argue for the legitimacy of and necessity for Marxism in Black Studies? No doubt this has been a hotly debated question both in the Black Liberation movement and in Black Studies for a considerable time. I tend to agree with Brian Lloyd: "I presume that we are witnessing, not the death of Marxism, but the end of the first period during which Marxists managed to seize and, for a time, wield state power. That it has fewer adherents at the end than during other phases of this period, and that as many of them can be found in universities as in factories or fields, is neither disheartening as is imaged by some of its proponents nor as amusing as is supposed by all of its detractors."38 It has become the custom to summarily dismiss Marxism as a viable methodological approach and philosophical perspective for Black Studies. Most of the adversarial postures toward Marxism-Leninism in Black Studies have discounted the value of a materialist dialectical philosophy of liberation, class analysis, class struggle, proletarian internationalism, and the scientific socialist principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Despite the sharp divergence of their political views, Harold Cruse, Cedric Robinson, Cornel West, Marimba Ani, Patricia Hill Collins, and Charles Mills have condemned Marx and Marxism for everything from economic determinism to class reductionism to historical teleology and any number of other "conceits." We even find Asante making such puerile statements such as the following: "In fact, we have no history of a communist movement in the United States where communists put their bodies and l.ives on the line as African Americans did."39 Contrary to Asante's claim, scholars such as Mark Naison, Ted Vincent, Erik S. McDuffie, Gerald Horne, Carole Boyce Davies, Robin Kelley, Minkah Makalani, and Mark Solomon in addition to autobiographies by Harry Haywood, Hosea Hudson, and Michael Hamlin offer a much more nuanced picture of communism, socialism, and Marxism-Leninism in Black life and culture. Over the years, scholarship in labor studies and Black Studies has revealed the historical legacy of Black worker militancy. As we travel through the annals of Black history, we unearth Peter Clark's crucial involvement in the Great Railway Strike of 1877, Lucy Parsons's unflinching engagement in the Haymarket Square struggle, the heroic efforts of Ralph Gray, Tommy Gray, Eula Gray, Al Murphy, and scores of Black sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and agricultural laborers to organize the predominantly Black underground organization the Share Croppers Union, A. Philip Randolph's tireless efforts with the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Ferdinand Smith's vanguard role in the National Maritime Union and Paul Robeson's monumental efforts to use folk music to entertain Spanish Civil War loyalists and striking workers as he gave support to international socialist solidarity. We could mention the steadfast leadership of Velma Hopkins and Moranda Smith in the 1947 strike at the Reynolds Tobacco Company in Winston Salem, North Carolina. There were Black postal workers like Cleveland Morgan, a member of New York Branch 36 of the National Association of Letter Carriers, who played a seminal role in the nationwide 1970 postal wildcat strike. We could also mention the historic efforts of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers to organize wildcat strikes in Detroit, Michigan. And, in more recent times, we could mention working-class Black women who have fought against the attack on public services, such as public housing and welfare. We should not ignore the fact that many of these activists were socialists, and quite a few were Marxist-Leninist in their ideological outlook. The scholarship of Clarence Lang, John Arena, Adolph Reed, Barbara Ransby, Rhonda Y. Williams, and Joe Trotter has demonstrated the historic importance of the Black working-class to African American history and culture. They bring to light the centrality of class struggle and conflict as determinate features of what makes up the Black working-class. World capitalism gave birth to the Black working-class. The initial accumulation of large sums of capital, which in turn, was invested in the exploitation of European workers, derived from the slave trade and the plantation system in the so-called New World. In volume one of Capital, Marx so famously wrote "capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt."40 The ruthless exploitation of Black bodies, in a manner of speaking, became the proverbial goose that lays golden eggs, possessing the magical ability to increase the magnitude of capital. Incidentally, the profitability of the "proverbial goose" prompted slaveholder Thomas Jefferson to remark, "it would never do to destroy the goose."41 Leaving the decks of the slave ship, "In the Name of Jesus," large numbers of Wolof, Mande, Fulani, and Mandingo were bound together by chains, from neck to neck and wrist to wrist.42 Out of the diversity of African ethnic groups a new synthesis was formed under the brutal system of capitalist slavery, giving birth to African Americans. The incessant "demand for Black labor" by Northern industrial capital and the plantation bourgeoisie fueled world capitalist development. Black slaves toiled in textile mills, shipyards, sawmills, and coalmines from Virginia to Mississippi. Black women labored on tobacco fields in the Carolina piedmont and picked cotton on plantations along the coast of Georgia. Black men like Tom Molineaux and Black women like Sylvia DuBois were given release time from slave labor in order to engage in athletic labor (as boxers) to bring entertainment and profits to slaveholders and the larger white Southern community. 43 From the seventeenth century to the twenty-first century, from slave plantations to auto factories, Black women, men, and children labored under the hard times of capitalist exploitation. The brutal forces unleashed by the capitalist drive for surplus value laid the foundation for the development of African American life and culture, from religion to music.44 Presently, we are witnessing, from New York to North Carolina to Missouri to Wisconsin to California, concerted attacks on public sector workers in order to resolve the economic crisis ravaging US capitalism. We cannot ignore the fact that Black people are prominent in the leadership as well as in the rank and file in a great number of these mass demonstrations. In cities throughout the country, working-class men and women, Black, white, and Latino, are being blown away by police officers who are ultimately protected by the rule of law. In the aftermath of the murders of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Aiyanna Jones, Yvette Smith, Rekia Boyd, and Eric Garner, Black working people are not silently standing by while the "Lords of Capital" via their "special bodies of armed men'' – with military weapons and tanks – confront them in the streets. This seminal point is lost on Black critics of Marxism during the past 90 years. As numerous studies in AAS have demonstrated, the working-class is not one-dimensional, exclusively composed of white people. The working-class is composed of women, men, and children, in addition to being multinational in character. Marxist studies of Black working-class life and culture are needed now more than ever because in the souls of the Black working-class the grapes of wrarh are filling and growing heavy. As Karl Marx so famously put it, "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses."45 Philosophy of African American Studies, I hope, wilt serve a prolegomena to the Herculean task of developing a philosophy of AAS from the standpoint of materialism. How well I have backed up this reaffirmation of philosophical materialism and revolutionary socialism with good arguments I leave it to my readers to judge. But the attempt to do so provides an answer-satisfactory to me at least-to justify writing this book.

#### 3---No link and turn---previous iterations of the party failed because of a slide to bureaucratic state capitalism and its racist and sexist organizational policies---Black Maoism can self-correct through the vanguard---giving up on the party is worse because horizontalism zeroes organizing against the Right

Dean and Mertz 16 (Jodi and Chuck, Donald R. Harter ’39 Professor of Humanities and Social Sciences @ Hobart and William Smith Colleges and Host at This is Hell!, “The JFRP: For a New Communist Party,” aNtiDoTe Zine 1/23/16, https://antidotezine.com/2016/01/23/for-a-new-communist-party/)

CM: Great to have you on the show.¶ Let’s start with Occupy. What, to you, explains the impact that the Tea Party had on Republicans, relative to the impact that Occupy seems to have had on the Democratic Party? All of the sudden there were “Tea Party Republicans.” There weren’t “Occupy Democrats.”¶ JD: That’s a good point. The Tea Party took the Republican Party as its target. They decided that their goal was going to be to influence the political system by getting people elected and basically by trying to take over part of government. That’s why they were able to have good effects. They didn’t regard the mainstream political process as something irrelevant to their concerns. They thought of it as something to seize.¶ The problem with many—but not all—leftists in the US is that they think the political process is so corrupted that we have to completely refuse it, and leave it altogether. The Tea Party decided to act as an organized militant force, and too much of the US left (we saw this in the wake of Occupy) has thought that to be “militant” means to refuse and disperse and become fragmented.¶ CM: So what explains the left turning its back on the collective action of a political party? It would seem like a political party would fit into what the left would historically want: an apparatus that can organize collective action.¶ JD: There are multiple things. First, the fear of success: the left has learned from the excesses of the twentieth century. Where Communist and socialist parties “succeeded,” there was violence and purges and repression. One reason the left has turned its back is because of this historical experience of state socialism. And we have taken that to mean that we should not ever have a state. I think that’s the wrong answer. That we—as the left—made a mistake with some regimes does not have to mean that we can never learn.¶ Another reason that the left has turned its back on the party form has been the important criticism of twentieth century parties that have been too white, too masculine, potentially homophobic; parties that have operated in intensely hierarchical fashion. Those criticisms are real. But rather than saying we can’t have a party form because that’s just what a party does, why not make a party that is not repressive and does not exclude or diminish people on the basis of sex, race, or sexuality?¶ So we’ve got at least two historical problems that have made people very reluctant to use the party. I also think that, whether or not you mark it as 1968 or 1989, the left’s embrace of cultural individualism and the free flow of personal experimentation has made it critical of discipline and critical of collectivity. But I think that’s just a capitalist sellout. Saying everybody should just “do their own thing” is just going in the direction of the dominant culture. That is actually not a left position at all.¶ CM: So does identity politics undermine collectivism? And did that end up leading to fragmentation and a weakening of the left? Because there are a lot of people we’ve had on the show—and one person in particular, Thomas Frank—who say that there is no left in the United States.¶ JD: First I want to say that I disagree with the claim that there is no left. In fact, I think that “the left” is that group that keeps denying its own existence. We’re always saying that we’re the ones who don’t exist. But the right thinks that we exist. That’s what is so fantastic, actually. Did you see the New York Post screaming that Bernie Sanders is really a communist? Great! They’re really still afraid of communists! And it’s people on the left who say, “Oh, no, we’re not here at all!”¶ The left denies its own existence and it denies its own collectivity. Now, is identity politics to blame? Maybe it’s better to say that identity politics has been a symptom of the pressure of capitalism. Capitalism has operated in the US by exacerbating racial differences. That has to be addressed on the left, and the left has been addressing that. But we haven’t been addressing it in a way that recognizes how racism operates to support capitalism. Instead, we’ve made it too much about identity rather than as an element in building collective solidarity.¶ I’m trying to find a way around this to express that identity politics has been important but it’s reached its limits. Identity politics can’t go any further insofar as it denies the impact of capitalism. An identity politics that just rests on itself is nothing but liberalism. Like all of the sudden everything will be better if black people and white people are equally exploited? What if black people and white people say, “No, we don’t want to live in a society based on exploitation?”¶ CM: You were saying that the left denies its own collectivity. Is that only in the US? Is that unique to the US culture of the left?¶ JD: That’s a really important question, and I’m not sure. Traveling in Europe, I see two different things. On the one hand I see a broad left discussion that is, in part, mediated through social media and is pretty generational—people in their twenties and thirties or younger—and that there’s a general feeling about the problem of collectivity, the problem of building something with cohesion, and a temptation to just emphasize multiplicity. You see this everywhere. Everybody worries about this, as far as what I’ve seen.¶ On the other hand, there are countries whose political culture has embraced parties much more, and fights politically through parties. Like Greece, for example—and we’ve seen the ups and downs with Syriza over the last two years. And Spain also. Because they have a parliamentary system where small parties can actually get in the mix and have a political effect—in ways that our two-party system excludes—the European context allows for more enthusiasm for the party as a form for politics.¶ But there’s still a lot of disagreement on the far left about whether or not the party form is useful, and shouldn’t we in fact retreat and have multiple actions and artistic events—you know, the whole alter-globalization framework. That’s still alive in a lot of places. CM: You mentioned the structure of the US electoral system doesn’t allow for a political party to necessarily be the solution for a group like Occupy. Is that one of the reasons that activists dismiss the party structure as something that could help move their agenda forward?¶ JD: We can think about the Black Panther Party as a neat example in the US context: A party which was operating not primarily to win elections but to galvanize social power. That’s an interesting way of thinking about what else parties can do in the US.¶ Or we can think about parties in terms of local elections. Socialist Alternative has been doing really neat work all over the country, organizing around local elections with people running as socialist candidates not within a mainstream party. I think that even as we come up against the limits of a two-party system, we can also begin to think better about local and regional elections.¶ The left really likes that old saw: “Think Globally, Act Locally.” And then it rejects parties—even though political parties are, historically, forms that do that, that actually scale, that operate on multiple levels as organizations.¶ That we have a two-party system makes sense as an excuse why people haven’t used left parties very well in the US, but that doesn’t have to be the case.¶ And one more thing: there is a ton of sectarianism in the far left parties that exist. Many still fight battles that go back to the twenties, thirties, forties, fifties, and haven’t let that go. That has to change. We don’t need that kind of sectarian purity right now.¶ CM: You ask the question, “How do we move from the inert mass to organized activists?” You mention how you were at Occupy Wall Street; you write about being there on 15 October 2011 as the massive crowd filled New York’s Times Square. And you mention this one young speaker, and he addresses the crowd; they’re deciding if they should move on to Washington Square Park or not, because they need to go somewhere where there are better facilities. You then quote the speaker saying, “We can take this park. We can take this park tonight. We can also take this park another night. Not everyone may be ready tonight. Each person has to make their own autonomous decision. No one can decide for you. You have to decide for yourself. Everyone is an autonomous individual.”¶ Did that kind of individualism kill Occupy Wall Street from the start?¶ JD: Yeah, I think so. A lot of times I blame the rhetorics of consensus and horizontalism, but both of those are rooted in an individualism that says politics must begin with each individual, their interests, their experience, their positions, and so on. As collectivity forms—which is not easy when everyone’s beginning from their individual position—what starts to happen is that people start looking for how their exact experiences and interests are not being recognized.¶ I think that the left has given in too much to this assumption that politics begins with an individual. That’s a liberal assumption. Leftists, historically, begin with the assumption that politics begins in groups. And for the left in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the operative group is class. Class is what determines where our political interests come from.¶ I try to do everything I can in the book to dismantle the assumption that politics, particularly left politics, should begin with the individual. Instead I want people thinking about how the individual is a fiction, and a really oppressive fiction at that. And one that’s actually, conveniently, falling apart.¶ CM: You write about Occupy Wall Street having been an opening but having had no continuing momentum. You mention that the party could add that needed momentum. That’s one of the things that parties can do. The structure of the party can continue momentum and keep the opening alive.¶ When you say that a party could be a solution for a movement like Occupy, you don’t mean the Democratic Party, do you?¶ JD: I’ve got a lot of layers on this question. My first answer is that no, I really mean the Communist Party. My friends call this “Jodi’s Fantasy Revolutionary Party” as a joke, because the kind of Communist Party I take as my model may not be real, or may have only existed for a year and a half in Brooklyn in the thirties. And I don’t mean the real-existing Communist Party in the US now, which still exists and basically endorses Democrats.¶ My idea is to think in terms of how we can imagine the Communist Party again as a force—what it could be like if all of our left activist groups and small sectarian parties decided to come together in a new radical left party.¶ So no, I don’t envision the Democratic Party as being that. That’s not at all what I have in mind. I’m thinking of a radical left party to which elections are incidental. Elections might be means for organizing, but the goal isn’t just being elected. The goal is overthrowing capitalism. The goal is being able to build a communist society as capitalism crumbles.¶ Second, it could be the case—as a matter of tactics on the ground in particular contexts—that working for a Democratic candidate might be useful. It could be the case that trying to take over a local Democratic committee in order to get communist/socialist/radical left candidates elected could also be useful. But I don’t see the goal as taking over the Democratic Party. That’s way too limited a goal, and it’s a goal that presupposes the continuation of the system we have, rather than its overthrow.¶ CM: But how difficult would it be for a Communist Party to emerge free of its past associations with the Soviet Union? Can we even use the word “communist” or is it impossibly taboo?¶ JD: We have to recognize that the right is still scared of communism. That means the term is still powerful. That means it still has the ability to instill fear in its enemies. I think that’s an argument for keeping the word “communism.”¶ It’s also amazing that close to half of Iowa participants in the caucuses say that they are socialist. Four or five years ago, people were saying socialism is dead in the US. No one could even say the word. So I actually think holding on to the word “communism” is useful not only because our enemies are worried about communism, but also because it helps make the socialists seem really, really mainstream, and that’s good. We don’t want socialism to seem like something that only happens in Sweden. We want it to seem like that’s what America should have at a bare minimum.¶ One last thing about the history of communism: every political ideology that has infused a state form has done awful things. For the most part, if people like the ideology, they either let the awful things slide, or they use the ideology to criticize the awful things that the state does. We can do the same thing with communism. It’s helpful to recognize that the countries we understand to have been ruled by Communist Parties were never really communist—they didn’t even claim to have achieved communism themselves. We can say that state socialism made these mistakes, and in so doing was betraying communist ideals.¶ I don’t think we need to abandon these terms or come up with new ones. I think we need to use the power that they have. And people recognize this, which is what makes it exciting.¶ CM: You write, “Some contemporary crowd observers claim the crowd for democracy. They see in the amassing of thousands a democratic insistence, a demand to be heard and included. In the context of communicative capitalism, however, the crowd exceeds democracy.¶ “In the 21st century, dominant nation-states exercise power as democracies. They bomb and invade as democracies, ‘for democracy’s sake.’ International political bodies legitimize themselves as democratic, as do the contradictory and tangled media practices of communicative capitalism. When crowds amass in opposition, they pose themselves against democratic practices, systems, and bodies. To claim the crowd for democracy fails to register this change in the political setting of the crowd.”¶ So are crowds today, the protesters today, opposed to democracy? Or are they opposed to the current state of, let’s say, representative democracy?¶ JD: Let’s think about our basic environment. By “our,” now, I mean basically English-speaking people who use the internet and are listening to the radio and live in societies like the United States. In our environment, what we hear is that we live in democracy. We hear this all the time. We hear that the network media makes democratic exchange possible, that a free press is democracy, that we’ve got elections and that’s democracy.¶ When crowds amass in this setting, if they are just at a football game, it’s not a political statement. Even at a march (fully permitted) that’s registering opposition to the invasion of Iraq, for example, or concern about the climate—all of those things are within the general environment of “democracy,” and they don’t oppose the system. They don’t register as opposition to the system. They’re just saying that we want our view on this or that issue to count.¶ But the way that crowds have been amassing over the last four or five years—Occupy Wall Street is one example, but the Red Square debt movement in Canada is another; some of the more militant strikes of nurses and teachers are too—has been to say, “Look, the process that we have that’s been called democratic? It is not. We want to change that.”¶ It’s not that we are anti-democratic. It’s that democracy is too limiting a term to register our opposition. We want something more. We want actual equality. Democracy is too limiting. The reason it’s too limiting is we live in a context that understands itself as “democratic.” So democracy as a political claim, in my language, can’t “register the gap that the crowd is inscribing.” It can’t register real division or opposition. Democracy is just more of what we have.¶ CM: We are so dependent. We use social media so much, we use Facebook so much, we use so many of these avenues of what you call communicative capitalism so much. How can we oppose or reject this system without hurting ourselves and our ability to communicate our message to each other? Can we just go on strike? Can we become the owners of the means of communicative production?¶ JD: One of the ways that Marxism historically has understood the political problems faced by workers is our total entrapment and embeddedness in the capitalist system. What makes a strike so courageous is that workers are shooting themselves in the foot. They’re not earning their wage for a time, as a way to put pressure on the capitalist owner of the workplace.¶ What does that mean under communicative capitalism? Does it mean that we have to shoot ourselves in the foot by completely extracting ourselves from all of the instruments of communication? Or does it mean that we change our attitude towards communication? Or does it mean that we develop our own means of communication?¶ There’s a whole range here. I’m not a Luddite. I don’t think the way we’re going to bring down capitalism is by quitting Facebook. I think that’s a little bit absurd. I think what makes more sense is to think of how we could use the tools we have to bring down the master’s house. We can consolidate our message together. We can get a better sense of how many we are. We can develop common modes of thinking. We can distribute organizing materials for the revolutionary party.¶ I don’t think that an extractive approach to our situation in communicative media is the right one. I think it’s got to be more tactical. How do we use the tools we have, and how do we find ways to seize the means of communication? This would mean the collectivization of Google, Facebook, Amazon, and using those apparatuses. But that would probably have to be day two of the revolution.¶ CM: Jodi, I’ve got one last question for you, and it’s the Question from Hell, the question we might hate to ask, you might hate to answer, or our audience is going to hate the response.¶ How much did the narrative that Occupy created, of the 99% and the 1%, undermine a of collectivity? Because it doesn’t include everyone…¶ JD: Division is crucial. Collectivity is never everyone. What this narrative did was produce the divided collectivity that we need. It’s great to undermine the ~~stupid~~ myth of American unity, “The country has to pull together” and all that crap. It’s fantastic that Occupy Wall Street asserted collectivity through division. This is class conflict. This says there is not a unified society. Collectivity is the collectivity of us against them. It produced the proper collectivity: an antagonistic one.